Common Law Remedies and the UST Regulations by Hayward, Allison Rittenhouse
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review
Volume 21 | Issue 4 Article 2
8-1-1994
Common Law Remedies and the UST Regulations
Allison Rittenhouse Hayward
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Courts Commons, Environmental Health and
Protection Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Oil, Gas, and Energy Commons, and the
Torts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For
more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Allison Rittenhouse Hayward, Common Law Remedies and the UST Regulations, 21 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L.
Rev. 619 (1994), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol21/iss4/2
COMMON LAW REMEDIES AND THE UST 
REGULATIONS 
Allison Rittenlwuse Hayward* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The corner gasoline station is a fixture in modern society. Each 
station keeps its supply of gasoline in underground storage tanks 
(USTs). For many years these tanks were made of bare steel, and 
installed without much concern for their potential environmental im-
pact. As these tanks aged, however, corrosion wore away the steel 
hulls and many began to leak. Once leaking gasoline contaminated 
local water supplies, tank owners faced potentially enormous expen-
ditures to clean up their leaks and compensate injured neighbors. 
Small gas station operators often lacked the financial ability to pay 
for this remediation and compensation. 
A popular myth in environmental law has maintained that individu-
als injured by pollution, such as a leaking tank, had little recourse at 
common law. An examination of common law actions for private nui-
sance, trespass, public nuisance and strict liability tells a different 
story. In fact, polluters often found themselves facing a successful 
plaintiff armed with a court injunction, and thus could choose either 
to bargain with the neighbor or cease business.1 Common law pro-
vided several remedies for victims of gasoline storage tank contami-
nation. 
Many political and technological influences, however, combined to 
support the notion that the private legal system could not adequately 
handle pollution from USTs. Congress passed comprehensive statu-
* J.D., University of California, Davis School of Law, 1994. This paper was written during my 
Summer 1993 fellowship at the Political Economy Research Center, Bozeman, Montana. Special 
thanks are due Dr. Richard L. Stroup and Dr. Roger E. Meiners for their comments on a 
previous draft. 
1 See infra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. 
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tory regulations for USTs in 1984.2 These statutes and their imple-
menting regulations create a cradle-to-grave regulatory regime to 
prevent leaking USTs from polluting groundwater. They set techno-
logical standards, notice requirements, remediation specifications, and 
penalties for violators.3 In an effort to manage this environmental 
problem better, the UST statutes also provide for state implementa-
tion and enforcement of their provisions.4 
ThesE~ regulations have affected UST owners and litigants in sev-
eral ways. First, they provide for large penalties for leaking tanks. At 
the same time, they harshly penalize conduct that results in no direct 
harm to the community.5 Furthermore, because states, following fed-
eral guidance, have set up funds for site remediation, communities 
depend on increasingly-strained state fund budgets to clean contami-
nated soil and water.6 
Perhaps the common law approach contains several flaws, but this 
Article argues that the regulatory regime that has generally replaced 
private law remedies does no better, and perhaps does worse. In 
Section I, this article examines the common law causes of action 
available to a plaintiff at the turn of the century.7 Section II turns to 
the UST statutes and regulations, and analyzes their text and pur-
pose.s Section III contains a discussion of administrative enforcement 
of UST regulations on the federal and state levels.9 Section IV returns 
to the common law, to evaluate how UST regulations have affected 
UST litigation.lO 
II. ACTIONS TO REMEDY POLLUTION DAMAGE AT COMMON LAW 
A. The Common Law at the Turn of the Century 
Several causes of action were available to a plaintiff at common law 
to protect and compensate him from toxic harmP For example, a 
plaintiff could request injunctive relief from the court that would 
242 u.s.c. §§ 6991-699li (1988). 
31d. 
442 u.s.c. § 6991c (1988). 
5 See infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra notes 222-31 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 11-80 and accompanying text. 
S See infra notes 81-184 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 185-248 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 249-87 and accompanying text. 
11 This paper considers only common law actions after the demise of the writ system. For a 
thorough review of medieval actions to remedy nuisance-like harms, see Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer 
and the American Law of Nuisance: Past, Present, and Future, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189 (1990). 
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require a polluter to cease a polluting activity. Also, a plaintiff could 
seek monetary damages for harm caused by pollution.12 Generally, 
these two types of remedies were sought in an action for private 
nuisanceP In some cases, however, plaintiffs could pursue trespass 
and strict liability actions for dangerous activities as well. In addition, 
the local authorities could use police powers to prosecute an offender 
for a public nuisance. 
Early common law judges generally cited the maxim sic utere tuo 
ut alienum non laedas,14 or "use your own so as not to injure others," 
when faced with a nuisance action. This maxim, when followed liter-
ally, leads to a strict liability rule for private nuisance.15 For ongoing 
nuisances, courts often granted injunctive relief as a remedy.16 An 
injunction would require a defendant to alter his practices to remove 
the nuisance, or otherwise cease operations.17 Therefore, in cases 
where a plaintiff obtained injunctive relief the effect of this doctrine 
was to allow a nuisance plaintiff to shut down the defendant's busi-
ness. 
The drastic result from using both the sic utere maxim and an 
injunctive remedy often led courts to seek ways to modify their 
For a brief discussion of the American common law writ system, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 11-12 (1992). 
Out of necessity, the common law cases considered by this paper only go back as far as the 
cases posted for each state in Westlaw's ALLSTATES-OLD Library. The first date varies from 
state to state. Nuisance actions for environmental harm were also very uncommon in early 
American history. See Paul M. Kurtz, Nineteenth-Century Anti-entrepreneurial Nuisance In-
junctions-Avoiding the Chancellor, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 624 n.23 (1976) (listing 9 
nuisance actions reported from 1789 to 1836). 
12 The damages/injunction bifurcation dates back to medieval common law writs. Plaintiffs 
could seek nuisance abatement through the assize of nuisance, however, the system limited 
access to this writ. Courts thus allowed plaintiffs to seek damages through trespass on the case 
for private nuisance or for special damage resulting from a public nuisance. If a plaintiff was 
ineligible for the assize of nuisance, yet would not be adequately compensated by monetary 
damages, he could seek injunctive relief in a court of equity. See Lewin, supra note 11, at 194-95. 
13 Plaintiffs could use common law nuisance to remedy a variety of activities aside from 
pollution. Of the 71 pre-I900 cases in which plaintiffs pled private nuisance available in Westlaw's 
ALL STATES Library, 21 sought damages or an injunction for polluting nuisances. Six of these 
involve sewage discharge. Plaintiffs pled private nuisance to remedy a variety of other commu-
nity ills from noise to flooding to prostitution. 
14 See, e.g., Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 522 (1897). 
15 Courts also followed the maxim of de minimis non curat lex, or "the law will not be bothered 
with trifles." 
16 Injunctive relief was not granted for private nuisance in colonial America. See Kurtz, supra 
note 11, at 625 n.24. This author notes that English Chancery injunctive relief for nuisance fell 
in and out of favor during the 18th and 19th centuries. Id. By the 1850s, however, courts 
routinely considered granting injunctions in private nuisance cases. Id. at 628-29. 
17 Injunctions were usually granted only when the plaintiff could show that the nuisance would 
persist. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Co., 57 A. 1065, 1068 (Pa. 1904). 
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rulings.18 One method required that a plaintiff pursue his case at law 
to establish his right to recovery before a court sitting in equity would 
provide injunctive relief.19 Courts would also deny recovery to plain-
tiffs if they found that the nuisance was a public nuisance, because 
the plaintiff's injury was no different than that shared by his commu-
nity.20 Similarly, some courts denied plaintiffs recovery if the nuisance 
was the kind of harm they should be expected to tolerate, given the 
nature of their community.21 Other courts extended this to hold that 
if an activity was lawful, it could not be classified as a private nui-
sance.22 Furthermore, some courts weighed the defendant's economic 
18 Some commentators argue that as the industrial revolution progressed, courts provided 
fewer injunctions to private plaintiffs in order to serve industrial expansion. See, e.g., HORWITZ, 
supra note 11, at 12-15; Kurtz, supra note 11. Other commentators dispute this conclusion. See 
Robert G. Bone, Normative Theary and Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance Law: 1850 to 
1920,59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1107-{)9 (1986). 
This author also fails to find a systematic pro-industrial transformation in common law. 
Modern courts, however, argue that it occurred. See, e.g., Patterson v. Peabody Coal, 122 N .E.2d 
48,51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1954); East St. Johns Shingle Co. v. City of Portland, 246 P.2d 554, 559-{i0 
(Or. 1952). 
Instead, common law judges appear to use various doctrines to modify strict liability on a 
case by case basis. As a result, American common law concerning pollution is unclear and 
confused. See Peter N. Davis, Theories of Water Pollution Litigation, 1971 WIse. L. REV. 738, 
738 (1971) (noting that judges' efforts to deal with individual situations renders American water 
pollution case law a morass of conflicting doctrines). 
19 See Sellers v. Parvis and Williams Co., 30 F. 164 (C.C. Del. 1886) (denying farmer injunction 
against fertilizer fumes until trial can determine rights); Kurtz, supra note 11, at 627; William 
D. Lewis, Injunctions Against Nuisances and the Rule Requiring the Plaintiff to Establish 
His Right at Law, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 289 (1908). But see Village of Dwight v. Hayes, 37 N.E. 
218 (Ill. 1894) (noting that proof at law requirement relaxed when nuisance clear result of 
defendant's activity). 
20 See Parrot v. Hamilton and Dayton R.R., 10 Ohio St. 624, 624 (1858). But soo Fischer v. 
Zumwalt, 61 P. 82, 83-84 (Cal. 1900); Lind v. City of San Luis Obispo, 42 P. 437, 438 (Cal. 1895); 
Story v. Hammond, 4 Ohio St. 376, 377 (1831). Courts would allow recovery to plaintiffs who 
demonstrated a special injury different from the public nuisance. See Kurtz, supra note 11, at 
640. 
21 See Thttle v. Church, 53 F. 422, 422 (C.C.R.I. Cir. 1892); Tortorella v. H. Traiser Co. Inc., 188 
N.E. 254,256 (Mass. 1933); Huckenstine's Appeal, 70 Pa. 102, 107 (1871). However, a number of 
old cases citing this doctrine then hold for the plaintiff as an exception to this ''rule.'' See, e.g., 
Sullivan v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Co., 57 A. 1065, 1068-71 (Pa. 1904) (holding that while 
Huckenstine's rule barred recovery for normal city pollution, change in furnace's coal quality 
made additional pollution an actionable nuisance); Barrett v. Mt. Greenwood Cemetery Ass'n, 
42 N.E. 891, 891 (Ill. 1896) (noting that pollution from drain under cemetery deliberate, so even 
though some urban water pollution tolerable, defendant liable here); Sullivan v. Royer, 13 P. 655, 
655 (Cal. 1887) (holding that pollution from neighboring smokestack not inconvenience flowing 
naturally from city living). 
22 See Parrot, 10 Ohio St. at 625. This appears to be an unusual conclusion, perhaps best 
understood as limited to railroads. The defendant made a similar argument, unsuccessfully, in 
Hobbs v. Amador and Sacramento Canal Co., 4 P. 1147 (Cal. 1884). In this case, a hydraulic 
mining company argued that since hydraulic mining was a legal activity, and washing tailings 
downstream was essential to the mine's operations, no nuisance action could be maintained. Id. 
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role against the plaintiff's loss in their exercise of equitable discretion, 
to prevent a small landowner's successful nuisance action from ad-
versely affecting the community's economy.23 Finally, in other cases, 
courts drew a distinction between activities that were nuisance per 
se, and thus subject to strict liability, and nuisances in fact. To recover 
against a nuisance in fact, the plaintiff would have to plead and prove 
that the defendant's negligence caused the nuisance.24 
Although nuisance actions often sought injunctive relief, courts also 
provided monetary damages to successful plaintiffs.25 Generally, plain-
tiffs would obtain monetary damages for past harm from a nuisance 
that had ceased, and injunctive relief for an ongoing nuisance.26 In-
junctions could also be obtained against an activity considered a nui-
sance per se in jurisdictions that recognized this distinction. In con-
trast, for a nuisance in fact a plaintiff was required to show actual, not 
prospective, harm.27 
Courts also recognized several defenses to private nuisance causes 
of action. These defenses permitted nuisance-generating activities to 
at 1148. The California Supreme Court thought otherwise, and upheld plaintiff's injunction. [d.; 
see also Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221, 227-28 (Tex. 1936) (holding that strict liability 
for nuisance only applied to illegal activities). 
23 See Mountain Copper Co. v. United States, 142 F. 625, 640-42 (9th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 
212 U.S. 587 (1906) (denying U.S. injunction because loss to community of smelter outweighs 
damage to 'marginal' land). But see Indianapolis Water Co. v. American Strawboard Co., 57 F. 
1000, 1004 (C.C. Ind. 1893) (arguing that granting company's right to pollute due to prominent 
economic role in community would allow taking of nuisance victim's property). 
24 See Laflin and Rand Powder Co. v. Tearney, 21 N.E. 516, 517 (Ill. 1889) (holding powder 
magazines necessary to civilization, not nuisance per se, so plaintiff must plead and prove 
negligence). After remand, this case was again considered by the Illinois Supreme Court. Laflin 
and Rand Powder Co. v. Tearney, 23 N.E. 389 (Ill. 1890). This time, however, the court held that 
powder magazines were nuisance per se, and thus the owner should be held strictly liable for 
damages. [d. at 390-91. In dicta, the court notes that activities appropriate to unpopulated areas 
should give way as towns expand. [d. at 391. See also Turner, 96 S.W.2d at 222-23 (noting that 
sic utere doctrine unfair here, and that plaintiff must plead and prove negligence to recover); 
Bohan v. Port Jervis Gas Light Co., 25 N.E. 246 (N.Y. 1890) (holding that if activity lawful, 
plaintiff must plead and prove negligence to recover for nuisance). For another discussion of 
nuisance per se and nuisance in fact, see McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 247 N.Y. 340 
(1928). 
25 See Gavigan v. Atlantic Refining Co., 40 A. 834, 835-36 (Pa. 1898) (verdict for $1,286 for 
illness due to odor from oil seepage); Hauck v. Tide Water Pipeline Co., 26 A. 644, 645-46 (Pa. 
1893); Sullivan, 13 P. at 656-57 (verdict for $100 and injunction to compensate for smoke); Story, 
4 Ohio St. 377-78 (verdict for $188.75 to compensate for illness and damages). To assist in 
comparison, $1,286 in 1898 dollars approximately equals $20,822 in 1987 dollars. One hundred 
dollars in 1887 approximately equals $1,260 in 1987. $188.75 in 1831 equals approximately $2,008 
in 1987. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS, COLONIAL TIMES 
TO 1970210-11 (Bicentennial ed. 1975). 
26 See Bliss v. Washoe Copper Co., 186 F. 789 (9th Cir. 1911). 
27 See Kurtz, supra note 11, at 638. 
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continue unabated. For example, courts allowed defendants to argue 
that state authorization for their activity, and the activity's public 
benefit, eonstituted a defense against nuisance actions.28 Defendants 
also asserted timeliness defenses such as laches29 and statute of limi-
tations30 and reliance defenses such as estoppel.31 Furthermore, defen-
dants could try to establish a prescriptive right to emissions.32 Finally, 
defendants could also plead contributory negligence.33 
In addition to private nuisance actions, plaintiffs used trespass to 
enjoin polluting activities. To prevail, plaintiffs would have to show a 
defendant's unlawfup4 entry onto their land.35 Intent or negligence 
need not be shown to succeed at trespass, which made this action 
particularly appealing to plaintiffs injured by accidental emissions.36 
Moreover, the statute of limitations for trespass ran longer in most 
jurisdictions which allowed plaintiffs extra time to detect and demon-
28 See id. at 653 n.158--U2 (citing cases in which defendants successfully pled authorization as 
defense against nuisance). A gas light company unsuccessfully tried this argument in Bohan v. 
Port Jervis Gas Light, 25 N.E. 246, 248-49 (N.Y. 1890). The court in this case noted that 
authorization only served as a defense to negligence if the defendant provided a public service, 
such as grading streets, and the ordinance expressly made an exemption from nuisance abate-
ment. Id. For another unsuccessful attempt, see New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 
(1931). 
29 The doctrine of laches holds that "equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on 
their rights." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 875 (6th ed. 1990). For citations to cases in which 
the defendant successfully pled laches, see Kurtz, supra note 11, at 634-35. The defendant 
unsuccessfully pled laches as a defense in Woodruffv. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 
F. 753, 795-98 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884) (holding laches defense inappropriate where lapse in time not 
due to plaintiffs' carelessness but due to procedural difficulties). 
30 Different jurisdictions specify different length statutes of limitations, beyond which a 
plaintiff's claim is "too old" to be brought to court. Generally, the statute of limitations for 
nuisance was two years. See, e.g., Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 791 (Or. 1959), 
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960). In cases in which the statute of limitations was pled as a 
defense, often much fact-finding was dedicated to determining exactly when the statute should 
begin running. See Davis, supra note 18, at 760. 
31 Estoppel prevents the plaintiff, because of his acts, from claiming a right to the detriment 
of another party. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 551 (6th ed. 1990). 
32 Courts sometimes granted prescriptive rights to pollute if the nuisance was not also a public 
nuisance. See Woodruff, 18 F. at 788; Kurtz, supra note 11, at 634-35. 
33 Some courts indicate that the plaintiff's contributory negligence would bar nuisance recov-
ery even if negligence need not be proved to establish nuisance. See McFarlane v. Niagara Falls, 
247 N.Y. 340, 349 (1928). 
34 "Unlawful" is equivalent to "without excuse or justification." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
1536 (6th ed. 1990). 
35 For an example of a trespass case where the plaintiff fails to establish such entry, see 
Carson v. Bromley, 39 A. 1115 (Pa. 1898). 
36 Similarly, the nuisance per se versus nuisance in fact distinction used in some jurisdictions 
had no effect in trespass cases. See Wente v. Commonwealth Fuel Co., 83 N.E. 1049, 1051 (1908) 
(when physical invasion violates private rights, it is no defense that defendant went to great 
expense to clean emission or that activity was not nuisance per se). 
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strate injury.37 Because trespass requires a physical invasion, early 
cases applied a dimensional test to determine trespass or nuisance. 
Under this test, if the offending agent was visible, plaintiffs could 
plead trespass, if not, they pleaded nuisance.38 Later cases modified 
the dimensional test, and allowed plaintiffs to plead facts as trespass 
that before could be actionable only as nuisance.39 
A plaintiff suffering from pollution could also base an action against 
the defendant polluter for maintaining an abnormally dangerous ac-
tivity. If the plaintiff could show the activity was abnormally danger-
ous, the defendant became strictly liable for the plaintiff's damages. 
The doctrine was first established in the famous English common law 
case Rylands v. Fletcher.40 States that adopted this as a separate 
doctrine usually consider whether the activity was common to its 
location, and whether the risks arising from it could be controlled by 
the exercise of proper care.41 
Plaintiffs could also seek punitive damages in limited situations. In 
early cases, courts granted these additional damages if a plaintiff 
repeatedly brought a defendant before a court for the same nuisance.42 
To obtain punitive damages, a plaintiff must show that a defendant's 
acts were done willfully or knowingly.43 Courts awarded punitive dam-
ages as punishment, rather than compensation.44 This remedy, how-
ever, also allowed a plaintiff to use evidence that a defendant took 
subsequent pollution control measures that could have been taken 
earlier in order to prove the defendant had the requisite "knowing" 
state of mind.45 
37 See Martin, 342 P.2d at 791-94 (discussing longer statute of limitations for trespass and 
describing similarities and differences between nuisance and trespass). 
38 See Keppel v. Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co., 50 A. 302 (Pa. 1901) (coal dirt deposits in 
stream a trespass); Hileman v. Hileman Distilling Co., 33 A. 575, 577 (Pa. 1896) (distillery slops 
discharged into stream a trespass); Lentz v. Carnegie Bros. & Co., 23 A. 219, 220 (Pa. 1892) 
(deposits of ash from coke works into stream a trespass); Gallagher v. Kemmerer, 22 A. 970 (Pa. 
1891) (deposits of culm and dirt a trespass). The dimensional test is discussed in Borland v. 
Sanders Lead Co. Inc., 369 So. 2d 523, 527 (Ala. 1979). 
39 See Martin, 342 P.2d at 796-97. 
40 3 H. & C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), rev'd, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), a/I'd, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 
(1868). 
41 See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 161-62 (1977). 
42 See Ellis v. American Academy of Music, 15 A. 494 (Pa. 1888) (holding the continued 
nuisance after judgment entitled plaintiff to punitive damages, no matter that plaintiff's addi-
tional damages de minimis); Long v. Trexler, 8 A. 620 (Pa. 1887) (noting punitive damages 
available when nuisance found by prior court). 
43 Reynolds Metals Co. v. Lampert, 316 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1963) (allowing punitive damages 
for trespass by emissions from aluminum reduction plant). 
44 See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1983). 
45 McElwain v. Georgia Pacific Corp., 421 P.2d 957 (Or. 1966) (remanding to grant punitive 
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Courts applied special standards in some cases when a public 
agency acted as a party in a nuisance suit. A public agency could act 
as a plaintiff, suing for its damages under common law nuisance.46 An 
agency could also declare an activity a nuisance under a local statute, 
in effect adding the activity to the list of actionable nuisances.47 An 
agency could also prosecute a polluter for a public nuisance using its 
police power.48 Finally, an agency could also be named as a defendant 
for causing a nuisance.49 
When a public agency acted as a plaintiff in a nuisance action, 
generally the same analysis applied as between private parties.5O If a 
public agency proceeded to abate a nuisance using its police power, 
courts often stepped in. In some jurisdictions, courts would only allow 
local governments to declare activities a nuisance if the activities 
damages). The lengthy dissent in this case notes that this decision punishes businesses for taking 
subsequent remedial steps. Id. at 961. 
46 See Mountain Copper Co. v. United States, 142 F. 625 (9th Cir. 1906). 
47 See Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897); Stone v. Heath, 60 N.E. 975 (Mass. 1901) 
(holding that local board of health given power under statute to declare decaying pile nuisance). 
A public agency's declaration that an activity was a nuisance could prove helpful to a private 
party bringing a nuisance action. Plaintiffs could then plead violation of the statute as making 
the activity unlawful, and thus in some jurisdictions subject to strict liability. See Beckwith v. 
Town of Stratford, 29 A.2d 775, 777 (Conn. 1942) (noting that when nuisance also an act violating 
law, contributory negligence no defense); Fidalgo Island Canning Co. v. Womer, 69 P. 1121, 
1122-23 (Wash. 1902) (constructing trap in violation of law creating nuisance per se). This 
doctrine was more leniently applied in some jurisdictions against municipalities. See Larson v. 
Cleveland Ry. Co., 50 N.E.2d 163 (Ohio 1943). This theory was used more often against violators 
of liquor, prostitution, and usury laws than violators of pollution-type statutes. See, e.g., State 
ex rel. Boykin v. Ball Inv. Co., 12 S.E.2d 574 (Ga. 1940). 
Violation of the statute could also be pleaded as negligence in jurisdictions that required 
negligence for nuisance abatement. The ordinance must protect against the injury complained 
of. See Laflin and Rand Powder Co. v. Tearuey, 21 N.E. 516 (Ill. 1889). Courts could find, 
however, that these criminal statutes amounted to a taking of property without compensation. 
See People v. Hulbert, 91 N.W. 211 (Mich. 1902) (holding that town ordinance that prohibited 
upper riparian owner from swimming in water because of possible pollution not within town's 
police power). For an ordinance to survive a takings suit, the ordinance must further the 
locality's health and safety. See People ex rel. Busching v. Ericsson, 105 N.E. 315 (Ill. 1914); 
Commonwealth v. Emmers, 70 A. 762 (Pa. 1908) (noting that ordinance preventing pollution 
within police power because pollution is dangerous to health); Sprague v. Dorr, 69 N.E. 344, 345 
(Mass. 1904) (noting that the authority to make rules to preserve sanitary water under the police 
power "is too plain for discussion"). With Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), the 
Supreme Court approved a broad interpretation of this exception to the Takings Clause. 
48 See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); RODGERS, supra note 41, at 
102-04. 
49 When plaintiffs named public agencies as defendants in nuisance actions, some courts 
expressed less willingness to require a public agency to pay damages, because ultimately the 
cost would be borne by the taxpayers rather than the wrongdoer. See East St. John Shingle Co. 
v. City of Portland, 246 P.2d 554, 563 (Or. 1952). 
50 See Lind v. City of San Luis Obispo, 42 P. 437, 438 (Cal. 1895). 
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would be considered a nuisance per se under the common law. 51 Thus, 
a public agency that declared a nuisance under a statute or ordinance 
ran the risk that a common law court would find no nuisance, and the 
agency would need to reimburse the defendant for abatement costS.52 
In summary, the substantive result from bringing a common law 
action to remedy harm from pollution seems quite varied.53 Neverthe-
less, one can generalize about the tools available to injured plaintiffs 
to obtain damages and relief. If a plaintiff sustained injury or was 
vulnerable to probable future harm, he could sue the nuisance-gener-
ating party for damages or an injunction.54 The nature of the injury 
dictated the cause of action a plaintiff could pursue. For a nuisance 
claim, first a plaintiff needed to show that the defendant's activities 
interfered with his use or enjoyment ofland. Second, the plaintiff was 
required to show that the defendant's activities caused this injury.55 
The plaintiff's job became easier when the activity was prohibited 
by statute, or fit the jurisdiction's definition of a nuisance per se.56 In 
these instances, a plaintiff met his burden of establishing a nuisance 
by stating facts that fit the jurisdiction's statutory or common law 
standards. Even against a nuisance per se or an unlawful activity, a 
plaintiff was still obliged to demonstrate substantial injury in order 
to recover damages, and demonstrate that the activity would continue 
to do him harm in order to obtain an injunction. In response, a defen-
dant could raise a number of defenses.57 Ultimately, the trial judge 
51 See City of Denver v. Mullen, 3 P. 693, 698-700 (Colo. 1884) (holding that city could not fill 
up ditch as nuisance abatement because ditch not nuisance per se under common law). But see 
Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410--11 (1915) (holding that city could declare brick kiln 
nuisance even though not considered nuisance per se at common law). 
52 Stone v. Heath, 60 N.E. 975, 976 (Mass. 1901). In addition, when a local agency acted to 
abate a public nuisance, courts showed greater willingness to award equitable remedies than 
they would for a private party, because government acts in its sovereign capacity to right public 
wrongs, rather as a private owner. See New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473, 482-83 
(1931); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). The concurring opinion in 
Geargia v. Tennessee Capper, however, argued that states and private parties should be treated 
alike. See id. at 239 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
53 For an attempt to organize and explain nuisance law in terms of competing property rights 
models, see Bone, supra note 18, at 1101. 
54 The ability to demonstrate injury could change over time as technology improved. See 
Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 522-23 (1906) (noting that this nuisance action may have failed 
in past because technology not advanced enough to detect typhoid). 
55 Horwitz discusses the causation requirement as a way to justify compensating an injured 
party without being accused of redistribution. See HORWITZ, supra note 11, at 52--53. However, 
the causation requirement also provides a nexus between nuisance-generating behavior and 
compensation, thus providing a deterrent to defendants and potential defendants. 
56 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
57 For example, in jurisdictions that required the plaintiff to establish negligence, the defen-
dant could raise contributory negligence as a defense. The defendant could also argue that the 
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would apply this varied and flexible body of nuisance precedents to 
determine each case. 
B. Developments in Common Law Nuisance 
Modern common law cases exhibit several different characteristics 
from the turn-of-the-century cases outlined above. The American 
Law Institute's release of the Restatement of Torts prompted some 
courts to use the Restatement's negligence rules to determine liability 
in common law cases. Courts also weakened the procedural barriers 
to holding multiple defendants jointly and severally liable for a plain-
tiff's damages. In addition, courts became more inventive about the 
relief granted to successful plaintiffs.58 
Nuisance law became more uniform with the release of the Restate-
ment of Torts. The Restatement's rule for nuisance instructed that to 
recover for a private nuisance a plaintiff must show a substantial 
invasion of his use or enjoyment of his land, and must show either 
that the invasion was intentional and unreasonable, or that the defen-
dant was negligent.59 Many courts adopted the Restatement's nui-
sance rule.60 Often these nuisance cases were decided in favor of the 
plaintiff came to the nuisance and thus assumed the risk of injury. If the plaintiff sought an 
injunction, the defendant could argue that damages were the better remedy. See supra notes 
28-33 and accompanying text. 
58 For further discussion of the historical transformation of common law procedure, see 
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules o/Civil Proce-
dure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987). 
59 See RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS § 822 (1939), quoted in Patterson v. Peabody Coal, 122 N.E.2d 
48, 51 (Ill. App. 1954). One commentator notes that the Restatement test demonstrates a radical 
departure from the common law tests in use at the time. See Lewin, supra note 11, at 210-11. 
Lewin observes that American nuisance law was grounded in natural rights theory and sought 
to preserve property rights against interference. The Restatement, in contrast, provided a 
positivist test that balanced the utilitarian value of competing activities. [d. 
The Restatement's departure from tradition and actual common law practice was noted by 
one commentator during the discussions surrounding the Restatement's revision. See Lewin, 
supra note 11, at 222. Lewin quotes Fleming James, Jr., one of the Advisors to the Restatement 
(Second). James stated that the balance of utilities test failed to explain the large number of 
cases that imposed liability without fault in "situations where the invasion of plaintiff's interest 
is so substantial that he should not be compelled to suffer it without compensation even though 
defendant's conduct entails no fault and is not abnormally dangerous." [d. 
60 See Nelson v. C&C Plywood Corp., 465 P.2d 314, 318 (Mont. 1970) (citing Restatement and 
Pennsylvania cases that apply Restatement, to determine Montana nuisance law); Fuchs v. 
Curran Carbonizing and Engineering Co., 279 S.W.2d 211 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955) (remanding for 
new trial because jury not instructed to take Restatement's elements into account to determine 
reasonableness); Patterson, 122 N.E.2d at 51; Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co. 77 S.E.2d 682, 689 
(N.C. 1953) (reversing for new trial because trial court "improperly" set forth elements of 
nuisance). Morgan was followed in Wright v. Masonite Corp., 368 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1966), a 
diversity case that applied, North Carolina law, and found no nuisance. However, the dissent in 
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defendant, because the plaintiff, following older common law, had 
failed to plead and prove negligence at trial, and had not established 
defendant's unreasonable or intentional conduct.61 To add to the plain-
tiff's difficulties, courts differed on what constituted unreasonable 
conduct. Some courts found that unreasonable conduct required a 
costlbenefit analysis,62 while other courts inquired whether the plain-
tiff had experienced substantial harm.63 Still other courts claimed to 
use the Restatement test, but applied it to match jurisdictional prece-
dent.64 
Modern common law cases also expanded the plaintiffs ability to 
hold several parties joint and severally liable for his injury. Early 
cases required that multiple defendants act jointly for the court to 
hold each jointly and severally liable.65 More recent cases allow joint 
and several liability if the plaintiff suffered harm caused by several 
defendants that could not be assigned among these defendants.66 
Modern judges also demonstrate greater inventiveness when struc-
turing remedies for successful plaintiffs. Accordingly, courts attempt 
to compensate damaged plaintiffs without compelling nuisance-gener-
ating businesses to shut down. In one famous case, Boomer v. Atlantic 
Cement, the courts essentially ordered the plaintiff to sell the defen-
dant a pollution servitude to his land, for a price in permanent dam-
ages set by the court.67 
Wright argued that North Carolina law differed from the Restatement, and properly applied, 
the law would find a nuisance. Id. at 666. 
61 See Patterson, 122 N.E.2d at 51-53 (reversing $5,000 damage award and holding nuisance 
from burning gob piles is not recoverable because spontaneous combustion is not intentional 
and because plaintiff did not prove negligence). 
62 Fuchs, 279 S.W.2d at 218; Patterson, 122 N.E.2d at 51-52. 
63 Morgan, 77 S.E.2d at 689. Sections 826(b) and 829A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
expressly allow this, by imposing liability if the harm to the plaintiff is unreasonable in that it 
is sufficiently serious to warrant compensation. See Lewin, supra note 11, at 228. 
64 See Associated Metals v. Dixon Chemical, 197 A.2d 569 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1963) 
(interpreting New Jersey common law to hold that any nuisance via airborne particles is 
nuisance per se and finding that this case contained intentional and unreasonable conduct, which 
constitutes nuisance under the Restatement). 
66 Early cases required that the plaintiff prove the defendants acted jointly in order for the 
plaintiff to hold them to joint and several liability. See, e.g., Hileman v. Hileman Distilling Co., 
33 A. 575 (Pa. 1896); Gallagher v. Kemmerer, 22 A. 970, 971 (Pa. 1891). 
66 Mitchie v. Great Lakes Steel, 495 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1974) (analogizing to auto negligence 
cases to change rule for plaintiffs seeking damages for pollution). 
67 Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N .E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970) (awarding auto-junkyard owner 
permanent damages for nuisance caused by cement company). On remand, the court awarded 
plaintiffs $710,737.56, about four times the permanent damages set by the trial court in the initial 
trial. Lewin, supra note 11, at 218. 
The Boomer case continues to prompt debate and analysis. See Joel C. Dobris, Boomer Twenty 
Years Later: An Introduction With Some Footnotes About "Theory," 54 ALB. L. REV. 171 (1990). 
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Several common law characteristics become apparent from this 
review. First, courts have applied a variety of different rules to de-
termine liability in pollution cases. This variety indicates that courts 
often use case-by-case judgment rather than rule-bound analysis. The 
common law history also shows that courts are skilled at adapting 
rules to new situations, and altering pleading requirements and reme-
dies to accommodate perceived shortcomings. The first-year law stu-
dent is often told that the United States contains fifty common law 
laboratories. In no area is this more apparent than in the pollution 
remedies provided by the common law. 
C. Reform and Regulation 
As public awareness of pollution increased, calls for systematic 
statutory regulation of polluting activities grew. Some believed that 
private nuisance actions were inadequate to prevent pollution and 
compensating for pollution harm.68 These common law critics argued 
that informational, procedural, and financial barriers precluded many 
affected parties from bringing suit, and that the judiciary's lack of 
expertise when assessing technological issues yielded poor results.69 
The common law proceeded case-by-case and relied on experience. 
Based on tradition, it produced conservative results, and, some ar-
gued, failed to keep pace with changing society.70 
With the enactment of the Clean Air Act,71 the Clean Water Act,72 
and the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act,73 most polluting 
activities became regulated by detailed federal statutes.74 Still, in-
jured plaintiffs found themselves in court to obtain compensation for 
This article should be read for the footnotes alone, which provide among other things a won-
derful critique of legal education's modern love affair with "theory." 
68 See Lewin, supra note 11, at 229 (describing criticisms of private nuisance). 
69 Boorner, 257 N.E.2d at 871. 
70 These observations are explained further in Wienczyslaw J. Wagner, Codijicatian of Law 
in Europe and the Codijication Mavement in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century in the 
United States, 2 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 335, 335-39 (1953). 
71 Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q 
(1988 & Supp. III 1990)). 
72 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & 
Supp. III l!l92)). 
73 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-B992k (1988 & Supp. 
III 1991). 
74 Other significant environmental legislation includes the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 
U.S.C. §§ H51-1464 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act 
of 1977,30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 300f to 300j-26 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
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personal pollution damage, using common law causes of action when 
regulatory remedies failed them.75 
One area in which the law shifted from common law remedies to 
regulatory enforcement is USTs. Courts have considered oil leakage 
complaints for decades.76 Early cases show the variety of ways com-
mon law courts applied nuisance law to cases complaining of damage 
from leaking oil containers.77 Newer cases depict the growth of mod-
ern common law treatment of joint and severalliability,18 and display 
the Restatement of Torts' effect on common law trespass and nui-
sance.79 Oil leakage is also an area where injured plaintiffs continue 
to seek compensation for injury, although this area is subject to per-
vasive regulation.80 Thus, analysis of this specific area of private and 
public pollution law should provide meaningful observations for other 
areas of pollution law. 
75 These regulations do not automatically preempt application of private nuisance law. Emis-
sions, if unreasonable, may still be a private nuisance although allowed by statute. See Lewin, 
supra note 11, at 230 n.221. 
76 Plaintiffs brought these suits often, because gasoline in water is detectable by human taste 
at levels as low as one part per million, a level well below toxicity. See Geoffrey Commons, Note, 
Plugging the Leak in Underground Storage Tanks: The 1981, RCRA Amendments, 11 VT. L. 
REV. 267, 269 (1986). 
77 See Jackson v. United States Pipe Line Co., 191 A. 165 (Pa. 1937) (holding defendant strictly 
liable under statute for oil leak into neighbor's well); Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221 
(Tex. 1936) (holding that plaintiff must prove negligence to recover for nuisance caused by 
oil-polluted salt water flowing from defendant's land to plaintiffs'); Shelly v. Ozark Pipe Line 
Corp., 37 S.W.2d. 518 (Mo. 1931) (holding that plaintiff cannot be compensated for speCUlative 
future damages, monetary damages for past harm is appropriate remedy for temporary nui-
sance); Gavigan v. Atlantic Refining Co., 40 A. 834 (Pa. 1898) (holding in suit for damages for 
injury from oil seepage that although business not nuisance per se, because it created public as 
well as private nuisance, plaintiff could recover without proving negligence); Hauck v. Tide 
Water Pipe-line Co., 26 A. 644 (Pa. 1893) (holding defendant strictly liable for damages from oil 
escaping his land, because oil not necessary to development of land, brought from distance). 
78 See Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 248 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. 1952) (allowing 
plaintiff to hold multiple tortfeasors jointly and severally liable for pollution of lake from oil 
pipelines without showing unity of purpose or share of injury attributable to each). 
79 Commons, supra note 76, at 274 (discussing oil leakage cases under common law rules as 
articulated in Restatement of Torts). The Restatement requires that a plaintiff prove that the 
defendant was negligent or intentionally allowed the nuisance or intended the trespass in order 
to recover. Jd.; Moore v. Mobil Oil Co., 480 A.2d 1012 (Pa. Super. 1984). 
However, plaintiffs did succeed in some actions in establishing that underground gasoline 
storage was an abnormally dangerous activity. See City of Northglenn v. Chevron, 519 F. Supp. 
515 (D. Colo. 1981); Yommer v. McKenzie, 257 A.2d 138 (Md. 1969); Commons, supra note 76, at 
279. 
80 See Wilson v. McLeod Oil Co., 398 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. 1990); Kulpa v. Stewart's Ice Cream, 
144 A.D.2d 205 (N.Y.S. 1988) (holding leaking tank owner can be liable under private nuisance 
theory, but requiring mental element for trespass); Moore v. Mobile Oil Co., 480 A.2d 1012 (Pa. 
Super. 1984) (remanding for damages a trial award of permanent injunction against service 
station with leaking tanks, ordering cleanup of contamination and supply of potable water to 
plaintiffs). 
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III. STATUTES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING LEAKING 
UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKS (LUSTs)81 
Underground storage tanks, typically installed to contain fuel at 
filling stations and fleet lots, came under the federal government's 
regulatory ambit in 1984.82 Congress passed subchapter IX (now sub-
title I) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 
to address the widespread environmental problem posed by the leak-
ing of petroleum fuels from these tanks into the groundwater.83 This 
section provides an overview of UST technology, regulation, and en-
forcement. First, this section briefly considers the technological chal-
lenges presented by underground fuel tanks. A review of the legisla-
tive and political history of these amendments follows. Third, this 
section examines the LUST statutory and regulatory text. Finally, to 
better describe the program's current problems, this section discusses 
legal and economic developments since the passage of the UST regu-
lations. 
A. A Brief Discussion of UST Technology 
Owners place USTs underground for safety reasons, because above 
ground tanks present a greater fire hazard.84 Underground storage 
also saves owners space, and thus money. A tank system includes the 
tank, pumps, and pipes necessary for filling and removing product, 
and for venting the tank. Pumps are placed either inside the tank, 
81 The acronym for the program was originally LUST, but was changed to RUST (regulation 
of underground storage tanks), and then ultimately to UST in an effort to avoid negative 
connotations. Nevertheless, the Office of Underground Storage Tanks is still OUST. See Kath-
erine S. Yagerman, Underground Storage Tanks: the Federal Program Matures, 21 ENV. L. 
REP. 10,136 (1991). 
82 Petroleum was specifically excluded from the definition of a hazardous substance in CER-
CLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988). This exclusion applied to gasoline even though additives in 
gasoline were listed as hazardous substances in CERCLA. Wilshire Westwood Assoc. v. Atlantic 
Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1989). 
Federal statutes to remedy leaking underground fuel tanks predate the RCRA amendments. 
See Heidi Brieger, LUST and the Common Law: A Marriage of Necessity, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 
L. REV. 521, 523 n.17 (1986). 
83 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991-699li (1988). See Glenn Waddell, A Practitioner's Guide to the Recently 
Promulgated UST Regulations, 41 ALA. L. REV. 487, 487 (1990). Structural failure of a tank 
may cause a leak, but leaks are primarily a result of corrosion. [d. The regulations regulate 
petroleum fuels, as well as CERCLA listed hazardous substances, but exclude hazardous wastes 
as defined in RCRA. See 42 U.S.C. § 6991(2). The goal of this regulation is to protect ground-
water from contamination. Yagerman, supra note 81, at 10,137-38. 
84 See STEPHEN M. TESTA & DUANE L. WINEGARDNER, RESTORATION OF PETROLEUM-CON-
TAMINATED AQUIFERS 7-8 (1991). About 97% of these tanks contain petroleum. [d. at 8. 
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which places the gasoline under pressure and pushes it out of the 
tank,85 or on the outside dispensing equipment, which creates suction 
that pulls the gasoline out of the tank.86 
Tanks generally leak due to corrosion. Tanks may corrode from the 
outside because the soil acts as an electrolyte, causing the steel to 
break down.87 Tanks may also corrode from the inside because water, 
oxygen, or bacteria have gathered inside the tank.88 Operators may 
also cause leaks by repeatedly bumping the bottom of a tank with a 
gauging stick.89 In addition, methanol blended in gasoline may soften 
tank lining and cause hoses and pipes to fai1.90 
An unprotected steel tank begins leaking when it is 10 to 20 years 
old, according to EPA estimates.9! On the other hand, fiberglass tanks 
or steel tanks coated with corrosion resistant material rarely leak.92 
Tanks can be retrofitted with interior linings, or protected by cathodic 
devices that divert the low-level corrosion-causing electrical charge 
generated in the ground to another piece of meta1.93 Double-walled 
tanks keep leaking gasoline from contaminating the soil and ground-
water, but are expensive. 
Once leaked, gasoline is difficult to clean from the soil and ground-
water.94 Clean-up methods for dissolved hydrocarbons include air 
85 A pressurized system will push gasoline out the breach and may leak a large quantity before 
the operator detects the leak. See Yagerman, supra note 81, at 10,137; ToDD G. SCHWENDEMAN 
& H. KENDELL WILCOX, UNDERGROUND STORAGE SYSTEMS: LEAK DETECTION AND MONI-
TORING 13-14 (1987). 
86 With a suction system, if the tank's pipes leak, the system pulls air into the fuel line and 
gasoline falls back into the tank. A suction system will thus warn the operator of a leak and 
cause less damage. Suction pumps only work well in low-volume systems with few dispensers. 
See Yagerman, supra note 81, at 10,137; SCHWENDEMAN & WILCOX, supra note 85, at 13-14. 
ffl John H. Fitzgerald, Corrosion of Underground Storage Tanks ... Causes and Cures, 
PLANT ENGINEERING, July 21, 1983, at 46. To discourage this corrosion, tanks are surrounded 
by a non-corrosive, clean material known as backfill. Yagerman, supra note 81, at 10,137. 
88 See Fitzgerald, supra note 87, at 46. 
89 [d. 
90 See J. Richard Shaner, How Mixes Can Ruin Your Equipment, NATIONAL PETROLEUM 
NEWS, Aug. 1983, at 41. In general, piping leaks twice as often as tanks. See Yagerman, supra 
note 81, at 10,137; TESTA & WINEGARDNER, supra note 84, at 8. 
91 See Yagerman, supra note 81, at 10,137. Over 75% of existing systems are made of unpro-
tected steel. TESTA & WINEGARDNER, supra note 84, at 8. 
92 Yagerman, supra note 81, at 10,137. 
93 [d. 
94 See DAVID C. NOONAN & JAMES T. CURTIS, GROUNDWATER REMEDIATION AND PETRO-
LEUM: A GUIDE FOR UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKS (1990) (describing technological require-
ments for cleaning gasoline from soil, groundwater). Once gasoline leaks from a tank it is difficult 
to clean. See Commons, supra note 76, at 270 n.29. Gasoline floats on water and coats rock at 
the top of an aquifer. [d. Only 40-60% of this gasoline can be removed by pumping. Also, 
groundwater moves slowly. [d. at 270 n.30. Since leaks are only usually detected when the 
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stripping, carbon adsorption systems, biorestoration, reverse osmo-
sis, ozonation, oxidation with hydrogen peroxide, and ultraviolet irra-
diation.95 Of these, air stripping and activated carbon adsorption are 
the most popular and cost-effective methods.96 Air stripping, however, 
releases volatile compounds into the air, and may therefore pollute 
the air.97 Because removing gasoline from soil and water is very diffi-
cult, UST regulations sought to prevent leaks. 
B. History of RCRA Subtitle I 
Groundwater contamination from leaking underground tanks be-
gan receiving discrete attention in the early 1980s.98 Tanks installed 
during the 1950s and 1960s boom in gas station construction were 
corroding and leaking their contents into the groundwater.99 At a 
contamination reaches another person's water supply, the groundwater may contain large 
amounts of gasoline before the leak is detected. Id. 
95Id. at 3~; TESTA & WINEGARDNER, supra note 84, at 153-75. Bioremediation using mi-
crobes that eat gasoline is also possible. See Marilyn, Goo-Eating Microbes Starve In-State, 
ARIZ. Bus. GAZETTE, Sept. 4, 1992, § 1, at 1. 
96 NOONAN & CURTIS, supra note 94, at 5. Generally air stripping is more cost-effective than 
carbon adsorption. Id. at 59. 
97Id. at 38. The capital costs for an air stripping tower range from $27,000 to $1,100,000, but 
can be much higher if air pollution control equipment must also be attached. Id. at 30. 
98 See TIMOTHY R. HENDERSON ET AL., GROUNDWATER: STRATEGIES FOR STATE ACTION 
14-15 (Envtl. L. Inst. pub. 1984). This attention began because tanks were beginning to leak. 
Also, Congress in 1983 funded a five-year study from the USGS to study groundwater contami-
nation. See id. at 46-47. Data on chemicals in groundwater and their dispersion had thus become 
available. Id. 
In 1984 an estimated 1.7 million petroleum tanks were buried nationwide. See David C. Scott, 
Plugging Leaks in Underground Gas Tanks, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 9, 1984, at 7. About 
35% of these are owned by major oil companies. Id. 
As ofmid-1992, an estimated 166,000 tanks were known to be leaking. Ruth Gastel, Environ-
mental Pollution: Insurance Issues, INS. INFO. INST. REP. (Dec. 1993). The total number of 
tanks is about 1.8 million at about 750,000 locations. Id. 
99 See Pollution, UPI, Oct. 27, 1984, available in LEXIS, N exis Library, UPI File (reporting 
gasoline leak into wells of 60 families in rural North Carolina, from tank at closed truck stop); 
Robert diNardo, Leaking Storage Tanks Emerging as Costly Threat to Industry, Communities 
Across the U.S., PLATT'S OILGRAM NEWS, May 22, 1984, at 4, available in LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, OMNI File (noting that leakage problem will get worse as tanks installed in 1950s 
corrode); Scott, supra note 98, at 7 (reporting that 35 cases of leaking underground tanks had 
been reported in Rhode Island since 1980, forcing several neighborhoods to drink bottled water); 
Richard March, Underground Gas Leaks Growing Problem, UP I, Apr. 3, 1984, available in 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (reporting leaks from underground petroleum tanks in New 
Hampshire); Regional News (Idaho, Wash.), UPI, Feb. 23, 1983, available in LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, UPI File (reporting that fumes from 12,000 gallon underground gasoline leak closed 
school in Argonne); Regional News (Ariz., Nev.), UPI, Sept. 16, 1983, available in LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, UPI File (describing 10,000 gallon gasoline leak from underground lines and a tank 
near the Las Vegas Hilton); Regional News (Md.), UPI, Apr. 10, 1983, available in LEXIS, 
Nexis Library, UPI File (reporting that leak from underground gasoline tank forced evacuation 
of three blocks in Frederick, Maryland). 
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Senate hearing held in late 1983, Jack E. Ravan, Assistant EPA 
Administrator for Water, estimated that 75,000 to 100,000 tanks were 
leaking 11 million gallons of gasoline annually into groundwaterYX! 
Additionally, the Congressional Research Service in 1983 had re-
ported that public wells were closed in a number of southeastern cities 
due to contaminated groundwater.101 About half the population in the 
United States depends on groundwater for drinking purposes, so 
these leaks raised concerns in CongressY12 Municipalities in several 
areas had successfully sued tank owners to pay for oil seepage clean-
ups. However, difficulties in finding owners with sufficient funds to 
pay for expensive measures, and concern for under-enforcementlO3 
coupled with legal time delays created additional pressure for a regu-
latory solution.104 
EPA sought to respond by proposing that these tanks be regulated 
under an amended Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).105 Senator 
100 See Groundwater Contamination: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Toxic Substances and 
Environmental Oversight, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 72-109 (1983) (testimony of Jack E. Ravan); 
Philip Shabecoff, Fuel Leaks Called Threat to Water, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1983, at AI. Ravan 
noted that gasoline was not classified as a hazardous substance and thus not regulated by the 
EPA. ld. This hearing marks the first time EPA formally identified underground tanks as a 
potential source of groundwater contamination. Leonard A. Miller & Robert S. Taylor, The 
Enemy Below, EPA Plans Action on Leaking Underground Storage Tanks, 15 ENv. L. REP. 
10,135, 10,136 (1985). 
101 See Lawrence Mosher, Polluted Gronndwater Clearly a Problem, but Few Agree on Extent 
or Solution, NATL J., Feb. 4, 1984, at 223. Many of these wells were contaminated with 
substances other than petroleum, for example, EDB, and trichlorethylene, and chemicals from 
deep injection hazardous waste disposal. ld. 
102 Miller & Taylor, supra note 100, at 10,136. 
103 See Commons, supra note 76, at 283-84. Commons argues that because the common law 
only resolves disputes between individuals, and requires showing particularized and substantial 
damages, societal injuries were not fully compensated. ld. at 283. 
104 See Scott, supra note 98, at 7 (citing Provincetown, Massachusetts, Richmond, Rhode 
Island suits); diNardo, supra note 99, at 4 (describing Provincetown suit, noting that 3,000 gallon 
leak discovered in 1977, jury trial expected to begin in mid-1984). 
Even so, individuals also sued and prevailed against leaky tank owners. See Leslie Anderson, 
Regional News (Conn., Me., Mass., N.H., R.I., Vt.), UPI, May 13, 1984 (describing suit by 
Carosellis and neighbors against local gas station for contaminating wells, verdict of $545,000 
for seven families, case on appeal at time of interview); Regional News (Cal.), UPI, May 16, 
1983 (reporting that 266 plaintiffs sued Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp. in Silicon Valley, 
for contaminating water with I-I-I-trichloroethane stored in underground tank). In New York, 
the state Supreme Court found Sun Oil strictly liable under the state's Navigation Law for 
damages to ten families caused by gasoline that leaked from a company-owned gasoline station's 
underground tanks. A trial was held to determine damages, although Sun Oil had paid four 
families forced to move settlement totalling $750,000. Plaintiffs sought the full value of their 
Long Island homes because fumes from the leak made them unsalable. See Regional News (N.Y. 
Metro), UPI, May 25, 1983. 
105 See Dmft EPA Strategy Would Control Gronndwater, BN A DAILY REPORT FOR EXECU-
TIVES, Jan. 6, 1984, at A-4, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNA File. The EPA estimated 
that about 75,000 to 100,000 underground tanks were then leaking. ld. The EPA expected that 
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David Durenberger proposed amendments to RCRA in February, 
1984 in his bill, S. 2513.106 This bill required inventory, registration and 
inspection of underground storage tanks and federal design standards 
for new tanks, as well as providing funds for remediation.107 Support-
ers of a statutory solution argued that regulation was required be-
cause a small amount of gasoline can contaminate a large amount of 
water.1OS Also, leaks were not usually discovered until a large amount 
of petroleum had already leaked into the groundwater.109 Actually 
cleaning a contaminated site was often not feasible, so regulatory 
proponents sought to prevent leaksPo Therefore, regulatory propo-
about one million tanks would leak, because they were over 16 years old and unprotected. [d. 
David Lennett of the Environmental Defense Fund commented that amending the TSCA and 
promulgating regulations for underground tanks would take about eight years. [d. 
As 1984 progressed the estimates of leakage rose. EPA estimated in May that of the 1.4 
million tanks nationally, 25% to 30% were leaking. See Anderson, supra note 104 (quoting Paul 
Keough, deputy regional administrator for the EPA in Boston). In July, the Office of Toxic 
Substances Director Don Clay estimated that 25% of the over two million tanks nationally "may 
be leaking." ReflUlatory Strategy for Underground Tanks May Require Daily Testing, EPA 
Official Says, BN A DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, July 13, 1984, at A-I available in LEXIS, 
Nexis Library, BNA File. Some industry representatives claimed these statistics were far too 
pessimistic, and that only one to two percent of the 1.4 million tanks nationally leaked. See J. 
Richard Shaner, Underground Tank Dilemma, 76 NAT'L PETROLEUM NEWS 36 (Aug. 1984). 
106 See Durenberger Plan for Underground Tanks Needs Tightening, BN A DAILY REPORT 
FOR EXECUTIVES, Mar. 2, 1984, at A-20, available in LEXIS, N exis Library, BN A File. 
Durenberger sought to amend RCRA because it would be enacted that year. [d. Environmen-
talists preferred a straight RCRA amendment because the hazardous waste office of the EPA 
would be responsible for promulgating regulations, and they "were a better part of the EPA." 
[d. (quoting Leslie Duch of the National Audubon Society). As predicted, the RCRA reauthori-
zation succeeded in 1984, while the Superfund amendment failed. See Joseph A. Davis, RCRA 
Rewrite Strengthens Hazardous Waste Protections, CONGo Q., Oct. 6, 1984, at 2453. Congress-
man James Florio proposed a rider in the House of Representatives that also proposed a 
"superfund" to clean up leaks from underground tanks and set specifications for underground 
tank regulation. See Shaner, supra note 105. Both bills contained similar provisions, including 
tank registration, leak detection devices and testing of all tanks, required reporting of leaks, 
and a $25,000 penalty for noncompliance. The Florio bill had the strong support of House 
Speaker Tip O'Neill, who demanded a bill before the Presidential elections. [d. 
107 [d. 
108 Deputy EPA Administrator Paul Keough said that one gallon of gasoline would contami-
nate up to 7'50,000 gallons of water. See March, supra note 99. 
109 [d.; Notes from the Underground: Mass. Tanks Found Leaking, PLATT'S OILGRAM NEWS, 
Apr. 5, 1983, at 4 (quoting Massachusetts PIRG study that found 40% of tank owners not 
checking daily for leaks). 
110 See U.S. EPA, A DRAFT GROUND-WATER PROTECTION STRATEGY FOR THE ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (Jan. 1984). Monitoring and remedying tank leaks was an ex-
pensive task for tank owners. One industry analyst estimated that a new tank cost between 
$5,000 and $10,000 in 1984, monitoring about $2,000 per system, and testing about $500 per tank. 
diNardo, supra note 99, at 4 (quoting Steffan Pleha, consultant with Fred C. Hart Assoc. in 
Washington, D.C.). Exxon noted that in its tank replacement program between 1979 and 1983, 
it spent between $30,000 and $70,000 per location for tank replacements and $30,000 per location 
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nents on the one hand doubted that leaks would be prevented by 
individual initiative, yet on the other hand wanted to develop a sys-
tem that would address the problem without engendering industry 
opposition. 
Meanwhile, state legislatures were already pursuing various pro-
grams to regulate underground storage tanks.111 Some oil marketers 
complained about further regulation, but also noted that standardized 
federal laws would provide consistent national standards and preempt 
the emerging patchwork of state law.l12 Other oil industry repre-
sentatives argued that the industry could handle the leaking UST 
problem without additional regulation. These representatives claimed 
that marketers carried liability insurance for "the worst possible tank 
for lining replacements. See Shaner, supra note 105. Mobil estimated its tank replacements cost 
about $27,000 per station, ARCO said its costs per station were between $50,000 and $60,000. 
111 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 376.30-376.317 (West 1985); Scott, supra note 98, at 7 
(describing Rhode Island's regulations, which included requiring double-walled steel tanks with 
sensors in the walls to detect leakage). Rhode Island officials drafted these regulations after 
gasoline contaminated a trailer park's water supply. See Anderson, supra note 104. 
Tank regulations were also proposed in Connecticut, Maine, California, Florida and Massa-
chusetts in 1984. See id.; diNardo, supra note 99, at 4. By July of 1984,32 states had or were in 
the process of considering legislation to regulate leaking tanks. See Regulatory Strategy, supra 
note 105, at A-I (quoting Heather Wicke, counsel for the Senate Environment and Public Works 
Committee). 
Between the passage of subtitle I in 1984 and the EPA's regulations in 1988, many states had 
passed their own UST regulations. These regulations exhibited a variety of approaches to the 
leaking UST problem. Some states implemented stringent release detection, while others re-
quired state-of-the-art leak prevention for new USTs. See 53 Fed. Reg. 37081 at 37215 (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. § 280). Some states tailored their regulations to whether the UST was near 
vulnerable groundwater. Id. Maine and South Carolina assessed groundwater vulnerability 
when setting UST standards. EPA justified their reliance on state enforcement in part by noting 
that many states already had programs. Id. 
112 Many marketers preferred federal action, albeit early, so that tank regulations would be 
consistent. See Shaner, supra note 105, at 53. EPA, however, adopted regulations that allow for 
a variety of local regulatory approaches, so industry ultimately must cope with a variety of 
regulations. 
EPA retains the right to begin an enforcement action against any enterprise. Thus state 
enforcement discretion only lasts as long as the EPA agrees with its enforcement strategy. The 
EPA is required to notify the state before issuing an order or starting a civil action. See 42 
U.S.C. § 6991e(a)(2) (1988). EPA noted in 1990 that it planned to initiate enforcement action 
only against state-referrals of violations, and did not intend to check independently on compli-
ance. See Implementation of the Underground Storage Tank Program: Hearing on S. 1560 
Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Protection of the Comm. on Environment and Public 
Works, 101 Cong., 2d Sess. 5---B (1990) (statement of Senator Durenberger) [hereinafter S. 1560 
Hearings); id. at 32 (testimony of Peter F. Guerrero, GAO); id. at 51 (testimony of Lois Epstein, 
Environmental Defense Fund) (arguing that EPA enforcement of financial responsibility lax, 
enforcement of technical standards left to states because state rules stricter than "lax" federal 
standards). Only states with EPA approved programs have enforcement authority. Wyoming 
provides a vivid example of a state-administered program that is much more aggressive than 
the EPA would be. See S. 1560 Hearings, supra, at 27 (statement of Don Clay, EPA). 
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leak scenarios."1l3 Industry trade groups also provided testing exper-
tise and advice for owners of leaky tanks. They argued that these 
procedures provided cost-effective protection of groundwater, unlike 
some of the techniques sought by regulators.1l4 
EPA, acting under existing statutory authority, announced its own 
plan to address the UST problem.ll5 EPA said it would implement a 
national field survey to determine the extent of the leaking UST 
problem,116 EPA would also distribute a chemical advisory to tank 
owners on how to avoid, detect, and repair a leak, and would also 
publish a notice of proposed rulemaking to regulate underground 
tanks nationally under authority provided in RCRA.117 Despite EPNs 
independent efforts, Senator Durenberger's amendment to RCRA 
113 Regulatory Strategy, supra note 105, at A-I (quoting Michael T. Scanlon, Vice-President 
for Policy and Analysis at the National Oil Jobbers Council [now the Petroleum Marketers 
Association of America]). 
114Id. Scanlon noted that secondary containment and observation wells were extremely 
expensive, and that most leaks could be detected through a tank tightness test. 
Tank owners had economic motives to prevent and replace leaking tanks. See Shabecoff, supra 
note 100, at A-l. Not only were owners losing saleable product through leaks, but they also 
faced suits from injured communities for leaks. Id. 
Small tank owners, represented by groups such as the Society of Independent Gasoline 
Marketers of America and the National Association of Convenience Stores also proposed a trust 
fund to pay for cleanup and tank replacement, funded by a gasoline excise tax. See Commons, 
supra note 76, at 292-93 (describing industry proposal). A competing industry proposal, drafted 
by the American Petroleum Institute, proposed state response funds for cleanup funded by tank 
registration fees, and collected and administered by the states. See id. at 292 n.195 (contrasting 
SIGMA, API proposals). The SIGMA proposal would raise more money, and centralize the fund 
in the U.S. Treasury. The API proposal would keep the money with the states, and allow states 
to determine how large the tank fees need to be to support the program. Id. 
115 The EPA claimed authority to promulgate additional regulations under RCRA as it read 
before UST amendments. See Underground Tanks Prime Target as EPA Mounts Battle to 
Protect Water, PLAITS OILGRAM NEWS, Aug. 31, 1984, at 3; Review of the Groundwater 
Protection Strategy Recently Praposed by the Environmental Protection Agency, Hearing 
before the House Comm. on Government Operations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1984) (describ-
ing proposed program). The Congressional Research Service disputed EPA's claim to statutory 
authority absent a RCRA amendment. See Review of the Groundwater Protection Strategy 
Recently Proposed by the Environmental Protection Agency, Hearing before the House Comm. 
on Government Operations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 224 (1984) (Congressional Research Service 
legal memorandum). 
Ironically, the Carter Administration had proposed a national plan to protect underground 
water in 1980, but the plan was withdrawn by the Reagan Administration as a violation of states' 
rights. See Philip Shabecoff, EPA Strategy Set on Safeguarding of Water Supplies, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 31, 1984, at A-l. 
116 Although EPA would provide free testing, it would not compensate owners for lost busi-
ness during the 24 hour monitoring period. See Shaner, supra note 105. 
117 Regulatory Strategy, supra note 105; Underground Tanks Prime Target as EPA Mounts 
Battle to Protect Water, PLAIT'S OILGRAM NEWS, Aug. 31, 1984, at 3. 
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passed the Senate by a vote of 93-0 on July 26,1984. The final package 
was contained in a House bill, and passed November 3,1984.118 
The UST statutes in subtitle I of RCRA represent a large and 
comprehensive regulatory program that sets standards for states to 
implement under EPA reviewY9 The Federal Clean Water Act re-
quired about 50,000-75,000 entities to obtain permits in 1984. By 
contrast, at the time the RCRA amendments passed, an estimated 2 
million tank owners came under regulation.120 Many of these owners 
were too small to have much prior contact with environmental regu-
lation.l21 Rather than assess whether the problem of leaking USTs 
required a more limited federal program,122 or perhaps local or indus-
try regulation, Congress decided to pass a comprehensive program to 
regulate tanks from cradle to grave.l23 
118 Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6901 1988); see H.R. CONF. REP. 98-1133, 98th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1984). 
119 See Miller & Taylor, supra note 100, at 10,137-38. At least one commentator suggests that 
this level of detail was a result of Congressional mistrust of the Reagan Administration's EPA. 
See James A. Rogers & Dorothy A. Darrall, RCRA Amendments Indicate Hill Distrust of EPA, 
LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 19, 1984, at 28. By providing considerable direction in the bill, Congress 
prevented the EPA from exercising flexibility in its UST regulation. Id. This article notes that 
the amendments required numerous reports and new regulations, all under ambitious deadlines, 
and forecast that this would lead to hastily crafted regulations. Id. 
120 Miller & Taylor, supra note 100, at 10,138. 
121Id. at 10,139. 
122Id. at 10,143. For example, if the UST leakage was primarily due to faulty installation and 
aging, then the EPA could set a useful life for tanks, establish installation standards and monitor 
old tanks. Id. Alternatively, the EPA could have focused on the harm done to groundwater for 
all manner of discharge, rather than constructing regulation for specific activities such as USTs. 
See Lawrence N g, A DRASTIC Approach to Controlling Groundwater Pollution, 98 YALE L.J. 
773, 786-791 (1988-89) (arguing that effective national groundwater protection should rely on 
effluent charges). 
123 By favoring comprehensive regulation, EPA must also cull sufficient funds to implement 
this program. Although EPA requested $23.5 million for UST and $96.3 million for the LUST 
Trust Fund for 1994, the Clinton Administration has requested only $16 million for UST and 
$75.4 million for LUST. These figures are still above the actual budget for these programs in 
1993 ($15.9 million for UST, $75 million for LUST). See EPA Ground Water Planfor Smtes Will 
Not Succeed, Think Tank Says, GROUND WATER MONITOR, June 3,1993, at 6 (reporting study 
released by Center for Resource Economics, calling for increase in EPA funding). 
With budget constraints, perhaps the UST program will pursue inexpensive and innovative 
ways to prevent UST discharge. See, e.g., Cryogenics Offers Cheap Way to Contain Hazardous 
Wastes, GROUND WATER MONITOR, June 3,1993 (discussing freezing ground around discharge 
to contain effluent until remediation methods improve); Gastel, supra note 98 (recommending 
that instead of cleanup, contaminated land and groundwater should be restricted from use, 
reducing costs by 35%). 
The entire program's cost, however, would also include state budgeting for UST programs, 
as the EPA depends on state programs to enforce these rules. Certainly a total understanding 
of the cost of these regulations would also include costs borne by private individuals to comply 
with corrective actions and financial responsibility requirements. In 1991, the EPA estimated 
640 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 21:619 
EPA published the final version of UST regulations under RCRA 
in 1988.124 Between the passage of the RCRA amendments and the 
regulatory effective date, an interim prohibition forbid the installation 
of any tank, unless the tank met certain specifications.125 These re-
quirements resemble the regulatory standards, so this interim prohi-
bition automatically "promulgated" national tank standards.l26 
Critics of the UST program argued that the UST regulations would 
run small gasoline station operators out of business, by requiring 
them to purchase expensive insurance policies and make large capital 
improvements.127 Because the UST regulations differ from state to 
state, large interstate operators must comply with a variety of differ-
ent restrictions. Large companies thus do not realize the competitive 
advantage over smaller companies that is provided in centralized 
regulation. The regulations, however, provide an opportunity for en-
terprises involved in UST manufacture and repair to manipulate 
regulatory requirements to suit business ends.128 For example, state 
that these compliance costs would run $70 billion over the subsequent ten year period, an 
estimated $50 billion more than what would be spent without the rules. See Underground 
Storage Tank Program: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Hazardous 
Materials of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1991) 
[hereinafter House UST Hearing]. Corrective action is estimated to account for 63% of this 
expenditure, 24% upgrading and replacing tanks, 9% leak detection and 4% financial responsi-
bility requirements. Id. at 19. 
124 Underground Storage Tanks: Technical Requirements, 53 Fed. Reg. 37,082-37,207 (1988) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 280). This release was over 600 pages long. The statute initially 
required that these regulations must become effective by April 8, 1987. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6991b(f)(l) (1988); Commons, supra note 76, at 285. 
During the Reagan Administration, Congress included "hammer clauses" that prescribed 
harsh statutory consequences if regulations did not become effective by specified dates. See 
Richard C. Fortuna, The Birth of the Hammer, ENvTL. F., Sept./Oct. 1990, at 18,21; Commons, 
supra note 76, at 294. Hammer clauses were included in the 1984 RCRA hazardous waste 
amendments. See Fortuna, supra, at 124. Hammer clauses provide Congress with a method for 
monitoring agencies and enforcing its view on regulatory law without running afoul of Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding that legislative 
veto violates Constitution). " 
125 See 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(g)(1) (1988). The tank design must prevent releases over its opera-
tionallife, or be cathodically protected or clad with non-corrosive material. 
126 These requirements allowed Congress to guarantee regulatory standards without relying 
on an Executive Department's cooperation. See supra note 124 (discussing hammer clauses). 
127 Statement of Senator Steven Symms (ID) said UST legislation would run small gas stations 
out of business, leaving only the Seven Sisters. S. 1560 Hearings, supra note 112, at 10-11 
(statement of Senator Symms). 
128 See James Lyons, Tanks a Lot, FORBES, May 11, 1992, at 90. This article reports that a 
UST manufacturer lobbied to incorporate rules into the model fire code to prevent owners from 
repairing their tanks. This code was subsequently adopted as part of California's UST regula-
tions. This rule prevented the enterprise's competitor, a tank repair company, from competing 
against him. The competitor sued on an anti-trust theory. Government lobbying activities, 
however, are exempt from antitrust laws through the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Id. 
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regulations often provide a list of approved contractors to perform 
UST remediation.l29 
C. Text of RCRA Subtitle I 
The RCRA amendments regarding USTs provide comprehensive 
direction for EPA's regulation of USTs. They define a UST as a tank 
with 10 percent or more of its volume, including piping, beneath the 
surface.l30 They also list which tanks must comply with the UST 
requirements.131 Furthermore, system owners must notify state au-
thorities of their UST. Additionally, new tanks must meet standards 
of design, construction and installation. For example, USTs must be 
equipped with leak-detection devices, and any leaks must be reported 
following certain standards. The statute also directs EPA to set stand-
ards for leak cleanups and tank closures. The statute also provides 
EPA with authority to issue administrative orders or pursue federal 
civil actions to enforce the UST statutesYI2 
The EPA has promulgated extensive regUlations under these stat-
utes.l33 These regulations set forth procedures for operating UST 
systems, monitoring tanks,134 and reporting leaks.1M They specify 
what materials are acceptable for new USTs.l36 These regulations 
129 See Storage Tank Law May Change, CRAINS DETROIT Bus. J., Dec. 7, 1992, § 1, at 8 
(reporting that Michigan considering reducing approved contractors for UST program to com-
bat fraud). 
130 42 U.S.C. § 6991 (1988). 
131 Flow-through process tanks are excluded from regulation, for example. See 40 C.F.R. 
§ 280.12. This definition has been very controversial, as Congress provided no guidance in 
the statute. See Yagerman, supra note 81, at 10,139. Dry cleaning tanks are eligible for this 
exemption, but other similar tanks are not. See id. 
132 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991~991(i) (1988); J. GORDON ARBUCKLE ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
HANDBOOK 608...(19 (10th ed. 1989). 
133 See 40 C.F.R. § 280-81 (effective Dec. 22, 1988). 
134 For petroleum USTs, the regulations require monitoring every 30 days, using one of 
several specified procedures. 40 C.F.R. § 280.41(a). 
135 40 C.F.R. § 280.50. The reporting obligation rests with both owners and operators of USTs. 
[d. Reports are made to state or local agencies, not EPA. 
Operators are persons who have control of or responsibility for the daily operation of the tank. 
42 U.S.C. § 6991(4). The definition of owner is two-part. If a tank was in use before November 
8, 1984, and was no longer in use on that date, the owner is any person who owned the tank 
immediately before use ended. If the tank was in use on November 8, 1984 or brought into use 
later, the owner is any person who owns a UST used for storage or dispensing regulated 
substances. 42 U.S.C. § 6991(3). Although the "owner" definition depends on the definition of 
"use" no definition of "use "is provided. If tanks in use after November 8, 1984 have multiple 
successive owners, are all owners liable if the tank leaks, the current owner, or owners of the 
tank after it began leaking? For a discussion of this definitional problem, see Yagerman, supra 
note 81, at 10,140. 
136 40 C.F.R. § 280.20(a)(lH4). Alternate designs must be approved by the local agency 
implementing the regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 280.20(a)(5). 
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require that owners upgrade existing USTs to meet the regulatory 
standards for new tanks before December, 1998, or close them.l37 The 
regulations also specify how tanks should be closed.l3s They provide 
detailed guidance for corrective action to clean up leaks.l39 The regu-
lations also allow the EPA to levy up to $10,000 per tank per day for 
violations by owners and operators of these regulations.l4o In addition, 
violation of an EPA Administrative Order can cost the violator 
$25,000 a day for each day of non-compliance.l4l 
The UST regulators use Total Quality Management, which is a 
Japanese-style management structure that ideally encourages 
prompt and creative problem-solving.l42 Even so, site investigation 
after a reported leak may take 67 to 141 weeks, and one to two years 
to begin cleanup, even at high priority sites.l43 EPA attempts to 
hasten this process by allowing owners to clean sites in the short term 
without government involvement or approval,l44 Because most UST 
leaks are relatively small,145 this policy may allow for quicker clean-
UpS.l46 If long-term correction is necessary, EPA will then oversee the 
cleanup, and accordingly, the public will participate in the cleanup.l47 
137 40 C.F.R. § 280.21(a). The deadline allowed 10 years from the regulation's effective date, 
December 22, 1988, for owners to upgrade their tanks. Id. 
138 40 C.F.R. § 280.71. 
139 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.60--.67 (1992). The UST corrective program attempts to learn some lessons 
from Superfund, by providing a self-implementing program that favors quick cleanup over a 
purpose and review document approach, and sets site specific cleanup targets rather than 
uniform national standards. See Yagerman, supra note 81, at 10,142. 
140 42 U.S.C. § 6991e(d) (1988). 
14142 U.S.C. §§ 6991e(a) (1988). 
142 See Yagerman, supra note 81, at 10,136 n.5, 10,146. Total quality management (TQM) was 
developed by W. Edwards Deming, a statistician who created this program working with 
post-war Japanese industry. See id. The UST program was the first federal program to utilize 
TQM. See id. Steven Cohen and Ronald Brand, who implemented TQM in the UST program, 
have written a book on how to use TQM in government. See STEVEN COHEN & RONALD BRAND, 
TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT (1993). TQM is also endorsed as a tool to 
improve governmental performance, in DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GoV-
ERNMENT 159-60 (Plume ed. 1993). In addition, TQM is mentioned as the kind of reform 
necessary to improve government's delivery of services in Vice President Albert Gore's National 
Performance Review. See Vice President Al Gore's Report of the National Performance Review, 
"From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less," 1993 
DER 172 d145, Sept. 7, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNA File. 
143 Yagerman, supra note 81, at 10,142 n.103. 
144 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.61-.65 (1992). Owner's activities must still be reported to the imple-
menting agency. See id. 
146 About 70% are relatively small. Yagerman, supra note 81, at 10,142. That is, these spills 
only require "product recovery and limited soils management." Id. 
146 Id. 
147Id.; see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.66, .67 (1992). Although public hearings and review are 
required in the regulations, the PMAA notes that this requirement was expressly rejected 
during hearings in 1986. See House UST Hearing, supra note 123, at 199 (statement of Dave 
Robinson, PMAA). Public hearings add delay and costs to cleanups. Id. 
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EPA's regulations do not require specific technology. But they do 
attempt to prioritize cleanups so that those areas where effective 
cleanup can be accomplished, and where people depend on potable 
groundwater, will receive top priority.148 Generally, EPA has sought, 
in the UST regulations, to build a flexible and decentralized regula-
tory program.l49 Accordingly, EPA defends TQM for permitting the 
agency to obtain expedient results without reliance on top-down man-
agement or numerical quotas.150 
Subtitle I of RCRA also mandates that EPA set minimum financial 
responsibility requirements for UST owners.151 Owners of tanks at 
petroleum marketing facilities that handle over 10,000 gallons of pe-
troleum per month must carry $1 million for corrective action and 
liability per occurrence; for all other owners this coverage must be at 
least $500,000.152 Annual aggregate insurance for owners of 101 or 
more tanks is $2 million; for owners of 100 or fewer, the required 
coverage is $1 million.153 Although a liability cap of $3 million was 
proposed in early versions of the law, the current law contains no 
liability cap.154 In its regulations, EPA also encourages states to form 
funds to fulfill the financial responsibility requirement.l55 The financial 
responsibility element of the UST regulations has been very contro-
versial, especially with small owners who argue that the requirements 
148 Yagerman, supra note 81, at 10,143; 40 C.F.R. § 280.64 (1992) (requiring removal of con-
tamination to the maximum extent practicable as determined by the implementing agency). 
Factors for the implementing agency to consider are listed at 40 C.F.R. § 280.66(b) (1992). EPA 
intended that its guidelines would assist states in developing corrective standards. See Miller 
& Taylor, supra note 100, at 10,141. However, about half the states have adopted basically the 
federal guidelines. See Yagerman, supra note 81, at 10,146. 
149 Not only are states able to promulgate their own regulations, but local agencies, such as 
fire districts, may pass UST ordinances. See TESTA & WINEGARDNER, supra note 84, at 7 
(noting that 23 local health and fire departments adopted own UST regulations). 
150 Although some observers laud this policy, others criticize rules that allow regulatory 
discretion. See R. Allan Freeze & John A. Cherry, What Has Gone Wrong, 27 GROUND WATER 
458, 460-61 (1989) (supporting flexible regulations); R. A. Hodge & Andrew J. Roman, Ground-
water Protection Policies: Myths and Alternatives, 28 GROUND WATER 498, 501 (1990) (arguing 
that rigid rules provides politicians and lawyers no room to interfere, calling flexible regulation 
"an oxymoron"). 
Part of the UST program's flexibility may have been due to the Reagan Administration's 
support for "new federalism." The large numbers of small regulated businesses with USTs, 
however, required the EPA to rely on state and local enforcement. See Miller & Taylor, supra 
note 100, at 10,142. EPA estimated it could inspect no more than 5% of USTs in anyone year. 
[d. at 10,141. 
151 See 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(c)(6) (1988). 
152 40 C.F.R. § 280.93 (1992). 
153 This insurance may be in the form of a policy, a surety bond, letter of credit, qualification 
as a self-insurer, or any other method approved by EPA. See 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(d)(1) (1988). 
154 Yagerman, supra note 81, at 10,143 n.125. 
155 55 Fed. Reg. 18,567 (May 2, 1990). As of May, 1990, nine states had adopted state funds for 
the financial responsibility requirement. [d. 
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will force, them from business.l56 In response, EPA extended the finan-
cial responsibility deadline for small operators to December 31, 
1993.157 
Subtitle I also formed a trust fund to clean up leaking USTs.158 This 
fund cannot, however, be used to offset financial responsibility re-
quirements. Instead, the trust fund provides additional clean-up funds 
for owners who have met the financial responsibility requirements,159 
for sites where no responsible party can be found and the situation 
requires prompt action, or for sites where the owner fails to comply 
with corrective action orders.160 The state or federal government may 
seek reimbursement of these costs from the tank's owners or opera-
tors.16l 
EPA relies on state agencies to administer and enforce these regu-
lations.l62 If a state adopts its own program, EPA must review and 
approve that program, which by law must regulate the same aspects 
of tank performance and operations as the federal regulations, and 
156 Yagerman, supra note 81, at 10,143; Commons, supra note 76, at 291. Different sized owners 
are required to comply at different times. Petroleum marketers with more than 1000 USTs and 
nonmarketers with over $20 million in assets (Category 1) were required to comply by January, 
1989. Marketers with 100 to 999 USTs (Category II) were required to comply by October, 1989. 
Marketers with 13 to 99 USTs at more than one facility (Category III) were required to comply 
by April, 1991. Owners and operators with 1 to 12 USTs, or less than 100 USTs at one facility 
(Category IV) were required to comply by October, 1991. 
157 See Deborah Shalowitz, EPA Gives Reprieve to Some Tank Owners, Bus. INS., Nov. 23, 
1992, at 18. Many owners with older, uninsurable tanks, complain that funds spent on insurance 
would be better spent on tank replacement. 53 Fed. Reg. 43,321, 43,363 (1988) (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R. §§ 280-81). The EPA notes that financial responsibility requirements are specifically 
required by Congress. 
158 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(h) (1988). This fund is called the LUST Trust Fund. It was initially 
authorized to have up to $500 million available, by .01 cent gas tax on motor fuel. The ceiling 
was met in 1990, and extended to $1 billion by Congress. Yagerman, supra note 81, at 10,143 
n.122. In 1993 the House Appropriations Committee budgeted $75.37 million in addition for the 
LUST Trust fund. See EPA, House Appropriations Committee Approves $6.63 Billion EPA 
Fiscal 199.!, Budget, BN A DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, June 23, 1993, available in LEXIS, 
Nexis Library, BNA File. 
Because this provision was designed to close the CERCLA trust fund's "loophole" excluding 
petroleum, this trust fund is limited to cleaning up petroleum UST leaks. See Yagerman, supra 
note 81, at 10,144. Leaks from USTs containing hazardous substances are cleaned up under 
CERCLA. [d. 
159 Yagerman, supra note 81, at 10,144; 53 Fed. Reg. 43,321, 43,364 (1988) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. §§ 280-81). 
160 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(h)(2)(A)-{D) (1988). 
161 42 U.S.C. § 6991b(h)(6)(A) (1988). 
162 Groundwater regulation is traditionally a state responsibility. See Review of Groundwater 
Protection Strategy Recently Proposed by the Environmental Protection Agency: Hearings 
before a S~~bcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 
(1984) (statement of Alvin L. Aim, Deputy Administrator, EPA). 
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can be no less stringent than the federal requirements.163 States with 
approved programs apply their program in lieu of the federal pro-
gram, with EPA retaining authority to enforce provisions of the 
state's program.l64 In states without approved programs, tank owners 
must comply with both federal and state regulations.l65 States may 
also obtain partial approval, subsuming only a part of the federal 
requirements.166 
D. Developments 
By providing for state enforcement and state promulgation of 
stricter corrective standards, the UST regulations set a federal floor 
for tank engineering standards and remediation. At the time they 
were passed, these regulations were touted as an example of "New 
Federalism" and proof that EPA understood the importance of decen-
tralized administration and flexible response.167 
Alternatively, this distribution of authority could be viewed as an 
effort by federal regulators and Congress to benefit by controlling 
UST activity without bearing the monetary costS.168 Furthermore, the 
UST clean-up system only provides flexible, results-oriented regula-
tion if the "floor standards" are themselves flexible or modest. Al-
though some discretion is allowed to states in the corrective action 
language, the engineering standards for tanks are quite specific.l69 
The regulations specify performance standards for new USTs with 
notification requirements,170 reporting requirements for suspected 
163 See 42 U.S.C. § 6991c(a)-(b) (1988); ARBUCKLE, supra note 132, at 609. In contrast, RCRA 
Subtitle C hazardous waste state authorization criteria require that state programs be equiva-
lent to the federal program. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (1988). Thus, rather than create a uniform 
federal system for UST regulation, these criteria set objectives and allow state programs to 
meet them. Yagerman, supra note 81, at 10,145. EPA seeks to encourage a wide range of 
programs designed to meet the needs of each state, because of the large numbers of tanks, the 
large number of small owners, and the complicated life-cycle regulation required by Congress. 
Also, many localities had already adopted UST regulation when the federal rules were promul-
gated. [d. Therefore, in EPA's view local control was necessary for successful regulation. [d. 
164 42 U.S.C. § 6991e(a)(2) (1988); Yagerman, supra note 81, at 10,138 n.36. 
166 Yagerman, supra note 81, at 10,138. 
166 [d. 
167 See S. 1560 Hearings, supra note 112, at 82 (statement of Don Clay, Assistant Administra-
tor, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, EPA); Yagerman, supra note 81, at 10,136. 
168 Interview with Dr. Roger Meiners, Professor of Economics at the University of Texas-Ar-
lington, in Bozeman, Mont. (July 29, 1993). 
169 See S. 1560 Hearings, supra note 112, at 8 (statement of Senator Alan Simpson). Simpson 
noted that engineering and corrective action standards that make sense for the risks confronted 
in populous urban areas may not be appropriate for rural areas. [d. 
170 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.20-.22 (1992). 
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and confirmed leaks,l71 and inventory monitoring with recordkeeping 
requirements.l72 Because new tanks must prove compliance with tech-
nical standards, and old tanks must meet these standards by 1998, the 
federal UST regulations provide a dramatic example of shifting the 
report-driven burden from regulators to the private sector.173 In ad-
dition, when an owner closes a tank, he must report to EPA or the 
local reporting agency, measure for contamination, and maintain re-
cords to prove he observed operating and closure regulations.174 
The statutory financial responsibility levelsI75 also have been the 
subject of controversy; congressmen who supported these require-
ments now find constituent tank owners complaining that insurance 
is unavailable.176 A study prepared in 1990 confirmed that small busi-
nesses had difficulty meeting financial responsibility requirements 
because insurance was not readily available.177 As small operators 
171 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.40-.53 (1992). 
172 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.30-.34 (1992). 
173 Regulations that try to secure rapid enforcement often contain procedures that make it 
easier to secure a violation. EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GoING BY THE BOOK: 
THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 65-S7 (1982). Through recordkeeping 
requirements, enterprises must constantly be prepared to prove compliance. [d. at 49"'{)1. The 
regulation thus shifts the burden of proof from the prosecuting agency to the enterprise. [d. 
This shift requires the enterprise to prove a negative-that it did not violate the regulation. [d. 
The most dramatic form of burden-shifting is regulations that require enterprises to obtain 
agency clearance before engaging in an activity. [d. at 51. When the enterprise seeks prior 
approval, it must prove its attainment of lawful standards before being permitted to engage in 
an activity. [d. Thus it must either show foreseeable compliance, or that its plans meet specified 
standards. [d. Denial of the permit is the agency's sanction for failing to meet this burden of 
proof. [d. 
174 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.50-.53. This burden shifts not just to tank owners, but to sellers of tanks 
and of petroleum, because the regulations require them to notify the tank owners of their 
notification duties. 42 U.S.C. § 6991a(a)(5)-(6) (1988). The EPA can fine a liable party up to 
$25,000 a day for non-compliance, and up to $10,000 a day per tank for improper notification or 
a standards violation. 
175 These levels were met by most Category I enterprises through self-insurance. Category 
II enterprises seemed to be able to find insurance. Category III and IV enterprises had difficulty 
finding insurance. This difficulty prompted the Senate to consider delaying the financial respon-
sibility requirements for these small owners one year in S. 1560 (1990). The financial responsi-
bility requirements have been delayed for Category III and IV until December, 1993. These 
levels may be suspended if a state forms a fund to compensate victims and clean up spills. 
176 See S. 1560 Hearings, supra note 112, at 1. (statement of Senator Max Baucus). 
177 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, UNDERGROUND PETROLEUM TANKS: OwNERS' ABILITY 
TO COMPLY WITH EPA's FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS 3-4 (1990) (summarizing 
study results). When asked whether this situation would improve if the liability level were 
lowered below $1 million, respondents noted that most risks insured against were below 
$500,000. [d. at 30-31. This study also revealed that deductibles did not vary much with risk, 
but premiums varied widely, from $800-$1,600 a tank, and from $1,600-$19,000 a site. [d. at 4. 
One of the largest insurance providers, Petromark, went out of business in April, 1990. [d. 
Petromark was one of ten insurance companies that wrote liability and corrective action cover-
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complain, the regulatory deadline for their compliance continues to be 
pushed back.l78 
The financial responsibility requirements have had a perverse ef-
fect. Because the requirements must be met before the UST engi-
neering standards, the regulations send owners of old tanks into 
an unfriendly insurance market before upgrading.l79 Senator Symms 
noted that this phenomenon is backward from the way supporters 
envisioned the program: the owner would first be required to invest 
in new equipment and then purchase insurance. ISO When insurers 
require tank upgrades before writing policies, as most do, the financial 
liability requirements compress the 1998 technical requirements for-
ward to the owner's deadline for obtaining insurance. lSI 
The uncertain liability situation in this area has hampered owners' 
efforts to upgrade tanks. The regulations specify that the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act third-party defense applies to USTs, 
rather than the narrow Superfund third party defense. ls2 RCRA for-
bids owners from using indemnification or hold harmless agreements 
to transfer from the tanks' owners or operators, or third parties, 
liability for UST leakageY~l Even so, banks have refused to lend funds 
to UST owners to pay for tank upgrading based on the fear that 
third-party liability for environmental damage under RCRA could be 
construed as broadly as Superfund liability, under which banks have 
been held liable for clean-up costS.lS4 
In summary; the UST statutes came before Congress just as con-
cern for pollution from leaking USTs was growing. The resulting 
age for small tank owners. Id. Lloyd's of London assumed their policies and as of March, 1991 
accounted for 29% of this insurance market. See House UST Hearings, supra note 123, at 189 
(statement of Dave Robinson, Petroleum Marketers Association of America). Federated insured 
22% and Agricultural Excess insured 25% of the market. 
178 See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
179 The initial 1984 UST regulations allowed 10 years from the regulations' enactment for old 
tanks to meet engineering specifications. The 1986 amendments that added the financial liability 
language, required coverage by 1990 for Category III and IV owners. Thus owners were 
required to purchase insurance before they were required to upgrade tanks. 
180 See S. 1560 Hearings, supra note 112, at 10 (statement of Senator Symms) ("instead of 
protecting against leaks, the current program acts as a very large, very expensive band-aid"). 
Senator Symms notes that when small rural gas stations close, they impose another environ-
mental hazard. Either rural residents must drive further to obtain fuel, or will install their own 
tanks. Id. at 11. 
181 See S. 1560 Hearings, supra note 112, at 94 (EPA's answers to questions posed by Com-
mittee). 
182 See 33 U.S.C. § 13221(f)(1) (1988); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991b, 9607(b)(3) (1988). 
183 Yagerman, supra note 81, at 10,145. 
184 See House UST Hearings, supra note 123, at 192 (statement of Dave Robinson, Petroleum 
Marketers Association of America). 
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regulatory regime sought to clean sites, prevent leaks, and control 
liability using decentralized and flexible management tools. These 
regulations, however, set ambitious targets, and thus proved to be 
less flexible and responsive than promised. The financial responsibil-
ity requirements in particular served to make a difficult insurance 
situation more complicated. As described below, these requirements, 
coupled with federal and state administrative enforcement, have led 
to a perverse funding situation that hampers environmental cleanup. 
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT OF UST REGULATIONS 
Both federal and state agencies enforce UST regulations through 
administrative orders and penalties.l85 When confronted with an en-
forcement action, a UST owner faces a complicated hearing and ap-
peals process. The enforcement action usually requires that the owner 
comply with dictated remediation procedures, and pay penalties to 
the government. Often, however, the particular state has formed a 
fund, funded usually through fees on USTs and petroleum deliveries, 
to cover the owner's financial responsibility required under federal 
law. But these state funds are running out of money. Contaminated 
sites sit without the funds to begin or continue remediation, while 
liable owners are caught uninsured, having assumed the state's fund 
would cover these costs. 
A. Federal Administrative Enforcement 
EPA enforces the UST regulations at the federal level. Accordingly, 
EPA sets penalties using informal agency documents known as civil 
penalty policiesYll3 The civil penalty policies seek to deter polluters, 
185 In addition to requiring regulatory compliance, the enforcing agency may require further 
acts to "fully" comply with a regulatory regime, as necessary to protect human health or the 
environment. See In re Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., 1992 WL 166471, at *3 (July 9, 1992). In 
this appeal, the environmental appeals panel considered whether UST corrective action could 
be required by the EPA in a permit regulating solid waste under omnibus provisions in RCRA. 
New Jersey had already issued Sandoz a permit for this site. 
To exercise this general authority, the EPA (Region II) had to show that its permit conditions 
were necessary to protect human health or the environment. See id. at *4. In a complicated 
opinion this panel found that Sandoz's remediation efforts and the geology of the site indicated 
that no danger justified the EPA's additional requirements. See generally id. Apparently the 
EPA could require additional UST corrective action beyond what a state program requires in 
a solid waste permit if it could make the case that the additional requirements protected human 
health or the environment. See id. at *4. 
186 See Barnett M. Lawrence, EPA's Civil Penalty Policies: Making the Penalty Fit the 
Violation, 22 ENvTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,529 (1992) [hereinafter EPA's Penalty Poli-
cies]. Although the UST statute limits civil penalties to $25,000 a day for order violations, or 
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provide fair and equitable treatment of regulated industries, and 
secure rapid resolution of environmental problems.l87 Penalties 
should, under the policy, remove the economic benefit potentially 
gained by the violator from having neglected his regulatory obliga-
tions, such as by continuing to operate a UST that might be leaking. 
EPA also includes additional penalties as appropriate given the level 
of harm caused by this violation.l88 This final penalty figure is then 
adjusted to reflect the violator's willfulness, prior violation record, 
ability to pay, and other specific factors. The penalty may be de-
creased as an incentive for the violator to settle his case.l89 
For example, following these guidelines, in a 1992 ruling the EPA 
fined Coastline Purchasing Corp. $141,722 for UST violations.1OO 
Coastline had failed to file notifications on time after acquiring five 
USTs, had not emptied tanks or filed reports required for product 
removal, had not inspected the site and submitted inspection informa-
tion as required, had not filed a corrective action plan, and had not 
installed leak-detection devices on the tanks.191 The regulations re-
quired Coastline to report these USTs 30 days after acquiring them,t!l2 
in their case by November 13, 1986.193 The company reported four of 
their USTs on May 22, 1989. The portion of the total fine for failure 
to notify was $67,500, for failing to remove product was $10,639, for 
failing to determine contamination was $10,719, and for filing a cor-
$10,000 a day per tank for notification failure or for submitting false information, this limit is 
usually only a concern for egregious violations of short duration. See 42 U.S.C. § 9006(a) (1988); 
EPA's Penalty Policies, supra, at 10,530. 
The EPNs internal documents cannot be cited to create rights in legal actions, and the EPA 
may change these policies at any time without public notice. Id. at 10,531. Even so, administra-
tive law judges and courts often use these guidelines when setting penalties. Id. Plaintiffs in 
citizens suits have used the guidelines to negotiate a penalty with the defendant. Id. (citing 
Gwaltney of Smithfield Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49 (1987». Thus, these 
policies may be exceeded or reduced in court, and do not command judicial deference as 
regulations do. See id.; Friends of the Earth v. Archer Daniels Midland, 780 F. Supp. 95 
(N.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that civil penalty policies not binding and thus not entitled to defer-
ence); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (providing judicial deference to 
administration of statutes). 
187 See EPA's Penalty Policies, supra note 186, at 10,531. 
188 These two components are called the "benefit" component and the "gravity" component. 
The EPA has a computer model, known as BEN, that calculates economic benefit derived from 
non-compliance. EPA's Penalty Policies, supra note 186, at 10,532. A table explaining the 
potential for harm of various UST violations is in MICHAEL L. ITALIANO ET AL., LIABILITY FOR 
STORAGE TANKS 262-66 (2d ed. 1992). 
189 See EPA's Penalty Policies, supra note 186, at 10,532. 
190 Coastline Purchasing Corp., 1992 WL 156105, at *8 (EPA June 10, 1992) (default order). 
191 See id. at *1-2. According to the order, the site had been leaking. 
192 40 C.F.R. § 280.22 (1992). 
193 Coastline Purc/w,sing, 1992 WL 156105, at *1. 
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rective action plan late, and failing to implement it, was $18,278. The 
order also indicates that Coastline had removed the tanks on October 
31, 1990.194 Coastline had also failed to file pre-hearing documents 
within the prescribed deadline, and had subsequently failed to file an 
explanation (also required) accounting for the first failure to file. Thus, 
Coastline defaulted on the complaint, and was assessed this fine. 195 
Because Coastline defaulted, no public record indicates why they 
failed to report their USTs on time, or comply with the other regula-
tions. 
The penalty guidelines adjusted this penalty upward based on sev-
eral factors.196 The guidelines called for multipliers because a failure 
to notify the agency about USTs is considered a violation with a major 
potential for harm, and a major deviation from the regulations.197 
Failure to remove free product is also factored in as a major violation, 
and because the corporation, although asked to remove the product, 
failed to do so, the penalty is adjusted up again for "lack of coopera-
tion." 198Estimated avoided costs were also worked into the penalty, 
and multiplied by an eleven percent interest rate.199 
EPA also assesses penalties when UST owners violate EPA's ad-
ministrative orders.20o Although EPA may modify fines for violations 
of orders under their penalty policies, generally fines for order viola-
tions are assessed at the maximum level of $25,000 a day.201 These fines 
often heavily penalize UST owners for paperwork non-compliance, 
thus exacting heavy punishment for acts that do not directly harm 
the environment. Therefore, even without any indication of environ-
mental risk the EPA can craft a hefty fine for nonfeasance, although 
these fines will also be increased based on estimates of environmental 
risk.202 
194 Id. at *2-7. The portion of the fine for failing to implement required leak detection was 
$34,586. 
195 Id. at *1. See 40 C.F.R. § 22.17(a) (1992). 
196 See Coastline Purchasing, 1992 WL 156105, at *2. 
197 See id., 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 See EPA's Penalty Policies, supra note 186, at 10,536--37. 
201 See id. at 10,536. These policies have led to record fine collections, but the GAO has 
criticized the EPA for not monitoring regional office's application of these guidelines. Id. In 
response, the EPA has adopted tougher policies to monitor RCRA penalties. See EPA, RCRA 
Civil Penalties Policy, ELR ADMIN. MATERIALS 35,273, 35,274 (Oct. 1990). 
202 See Coastline Purchasing, 1992 WL 156105, at *2 (default order); Moyer Chevron Serv., 
1992 WL 293134, (EPA Sept. 11, 1992) (default order). In Moyer, the owner failed to provide 
release detection for three pressurized lines. He was fined $1000 for every 30 days from 
December 22, 1990, when the requirements began, to August 21, 1991, when EPA testing 
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A UST owner's right of appeal of a permit or penalty decision is 
limited under federal administrative law. Permits or permit denials 
can only be appealed on issues that the UST owner preserved through 
raising them during the comment period.203 Agency permit decisions 
are only reexamined by environmental appeals judges if based on 
clearly erroneous findings of fact or conclusions of law, or if the agency 
decision involves an important policy matter or exercise of discretion 
that justifies review.204 
A UST owner found in violation of the regulations also has limited 
due process rights under administrative law. Tank owners under EPA 
scrutiny are notified if an enforcement action is started against them. 
A hearing is not automatic; the owner must respond to this notice or 
he may be found in default. If in default, civil penalties and corrective 
action can be charged to him, without any hearing, and without the 
facts as alleged by EPA receiving neutral scrutiny.205 If the owner 
requests a hearing, the public is permitted to participate, which 
means that neighbors, public interest groups and competitors may 
bring their concerns before the agency as well.206 Due in part to this 
added participation, public hearings may absorb a large quantity of 
time.207 
personnel visited his station and found he had not conducted a line tightness test or performed 
monthly monitoring. His total fine was $9166. There is no indication in the order that these lines 
leaked. Moyer Chevron Serv., 1992 WL 293134 at *1-2. 
Public agencies are not immune to UST fines. In 1992 the EPA fined Detroit $1.5 million. See 
Vivian S. Toy, Financially Strapped Detroit Fined $1.5 Million by EPA, GANNE'IT NEWS SERV., 
Aug. 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File. These fines were levied because 
Detroit failed to properly report a confirmed leak and properly clean up leaks at two other sites. 
EPA detected these leaks during inspections of city-owned properties. Detroit also faced $10.2 
million in remediation costs. 
203 See, e.g., MacDermid, Inc., 1991 WL 158259, (EPA Jan. 14, 1991) (denying permit appeal 
request because subject of appeal not raised during public comment). 
204 See Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., 1992 WL 166471, at *2 (EPA July 9, 1992); 40 C.F.R. 
§ 124.19 (1980). 
205 See Coastline Purchasing, 1992 WL 156105, (EPA June 10, 1992) (default order). In 1987 
the Supreme Court held that defendants have a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial when 
the EPA determines liability and seeks penalties and injunctive relief under the Clean Water 
Act. 'full v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-27 (1987). Whether this right is also afforded 
defendants under other environmental statutes had not been determined. 
206 See generally GLEN O. ROBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY: PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUB-
LIC LAW 125-49 (1991); R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE 
CLEAN AIR ACT 10-11 (1983). 
207 See MELNICK, supra note 206, at 11. To satisty courts that the agency has given adequate 
consideration to competing objectives, it is in the agency's interest to have a large number of 
groups testify on the record at public hearings. ld. 
Two additional distinctions between administrative actions and common law actions deserve 
discussion. First, administrative agencies are not bound by the rules of evidence applicable in 
court. For example, under the Administrative Procedures Act, hearsay evidence is admissible. 
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Judicial review of agency enforcement actions is critical for consis-
tent law enforcement. It hardly makes sense for courts to recognize 
rights in legal actions and not require that the same rights be recog-
nized in administrative actions. A defendant in an administrative 
action may wait a long time, however, before he can seek judicial 
review, and this review will be limited to certain narrow factors. 
First, administrative remedies must be exhausted before going to 
court. A defendant's claim must provide a federal court with a case or 
controversy. The claim must therefore be an appeal of a final decision 
that the defendant has appealed through the administrative appeals 
process.2~ A defendant cannot, therefore, take an order he believes in 
error directly into court when issued. 
Second, courts show deference to administrative decisions. Once 
in court, usually the administrative decision will only be reviewed 
for exceeding the scope of authority provided by Congress, abusing 
authority, or for being capricious or arbitrary. In practice, the court 
will consider whether the action is within the agency's scope of au-
thority.209 If it is within agency authority, then the court will next 
See Administrative Procedures Act, Pub. L. 89-554 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 500--596 
(1988 & Supp. IV. 1992). 
Second, more plaintiffs have standing to sue to enforce regulations. Standing has always been 
a source for controversy. See Robinson, supra note 206, at 157 (describing history of standing 
controversy). The traditional rule required that the party demonstrate that the agency had 
invaded a legal right before courts would recognize his standing to sue. The Supreme Court 
expanded this standard to allow standing to parties aggrieved or adversely affected by an 
agency action. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Sanders Bros., 309 U.S. 470, 473-77 (1970). 
The court in 1970 created the standing test functioning today: to have standing a party must 
suffer an injury in fact, which is linked to an agency action and redressable by judicial relief, 
and that injury is within the "zone of interests" protected by the statute the party seeks to 
enforce. Association of Data Processing Service Org., v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-55 (1970). The 
injury prong of this test has raised controversy. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737 (1972) 
(requiring individualized injury for standing). This test only requires that some individual injury 
be alleged. See, e.g., United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669,684--89 (1973) (holding that very 
attenuated series of events eventually injuring party sufficient for standing). But see Lujan v. 
National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (requiring that plaintiff must plea specific facts 
that result in actual injury for standing). The Supreme Court appears to be more tolerant of 
liberal standing for environmental petitioners than for other types of groups. See ROBINSON, 
supra note 206, at 161-62. 
200 But see Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding 
agency's failure to act promptly resulted in irreparable injury was final disposition of rights). 
200 The court may also inquire whether the regulation is within the agency's discretion to 
promulgate. Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984). If Congress had "directly spoken 
to the precise question at issue" then the agency is obliged to enforce Congress's will. If, as is 
more often the case, Congress has not directly addressed the question, then the Court will 
examine whether the Agency's regulation is a permissible construction of the statute. [d. at 
842-43. That is, the Court should accept the Agency's interpretation if the statute is susceptible 
of interpretation-and should tolerate new regulations if the Agency changes its mind. The 
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consider whether the act was arbitrary or capricious, or contrary to 
the law Congress assigned the agency to enforce.210 These standards, 
however, do not have much bite, so generally agencies are safe prom-
ulgating regulations and enforcing them.211 
In summary, enterprises faced with penalties and corrective action 
under UST statutes may never obtain a day in court. They may decide 
that the delay in resolving their problem and the advantage of obtain-
ing settlement and immunity from EPA for the incident, makes liti-
gation not worth the trouble. They may also find that the regulatory 
action is not reviewable by a court of law. 
It is questionable whether such limitations on judicial review are 
wise. Selective invasive judicial review in some contexts had led to an 
irrational patchwork of laws and rulings.212 Still, courts may be able 
to correct and deter far-flung regulatory adventures prompted by 
interest group pressure.213 This may be particularly true when regu-
lators set penalties, assign corrective action, and control access to 
reimbursements, as with the UST regulations. In these circum-
stances, court review can insure that agency decisions are even-
handed, and reflect real-world technical realities. 
B. State Administrative Enforcement 
Because the federal UST program was designed to be implemented 
by states, most actions against UST owners arise under state admin-
istrative law. Thus, a brief overview of a few recent state-level actions 
dealing with USTs is instructive. States have, for the most part, 
incorporated the federal government's minimum standards instead of 
setting stricter standards.214 Furthermore, state funds to compensate 
Court should not substitute its interpretations for the Agency's. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial 
Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989). 
Interpretive rules-agency rules that do not depend on lawmaking power delegated by 
Congress-do not enjoy deference. See EEOC v. Aramco, 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1231-32 (1991); 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944). 
210 The courts that take the harshest view of administrative decisions often favor stricter 
regulatory control and greater agency activism. See MELNICK, supra note 206, at 12. 
211 See generally JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS 243-70 (1989). 
212 See Cass Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency 
Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522 (1989) (discussing regulatory irrationality produced by selective 
judicial review in Delaney Clause context). 
213Id. (noting the courts could protect against overzealous regulators); Jonathan R. Macey, 
Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Gronp 
Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 226--27 (1986). For a critique of this view, see Einer R. Elhauge, 
Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991). 
214 State agencies also use federal statutory interpretation to interpret these state statutes. 
See Shell Oil Co. v. Illinois Envtl. Pro. Agency, 1993 WL 210603 (June 3, 1993) (arguing that 
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victims of leaking USTs and clean up sites struggle with a tension 
between keeping the fund's fuel taxes low while maintaining sufficient 
funds to clean sites.215 
Many state jurisdictions follow penalty criteria similar to the fed-
eral criteria described above.216 These criteria consider an owner's 
history of violations, the gravity of the current violation, whether a 
violator benefited economically by violating the regulations, the de-
gree of risk to the community, and whether the violation was inten-
tional.217 An additional "penalty" may be exacted by the state by 
denying state clean-up funds to tank owners who fail to follow state 
tank regulations.218 
federal owner definition prevented Shell from receiving state reimbursement for corrective 
action, reversed by pollution control board). 
215 Whether a state or local government brings suit also depends on the fortunes of the public 
agency. In San Diego County, a six gallon a day leak from a UST drains into Rattlesnake Creek, 
while the county hopes California state officials will take responsibility for the cleanup. See 
Environmental Time Bomb: Fuel Oozes into Rattlesnake Creek (editorial), SAN DIEGO UNION-
'l'RIB., June 17, 1993, at B15. By contrast, in the city of National City, California, also in San 
Diego County, the city government is pursuing an expensive legal action against a business 
adjacent to city land whose leaking UST has contaminated city property. See L. Erik Bratt, In 
Praperty Battle, Only Thing Moving is Contamination, SAN DIEGO UNION-'l'RIB., June 21,1993, 
at B3. In this case, the city relies on state transportation funds to pursue the litigation. Id. 
National City is about $2 million in deficit in 1993. Id. 
216 But see MAss. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 11 (providing for a $100,000 fine or 20 years in jail for 
failure to notify state authorities of release). 
217 See Marcello Distributors, 1993 WL 85004 (La. Dept. of Envtl. Qual. Mar.4, 1993) (applying 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2025E(3)(a) (West 1989) containing penalty factors); G.D. Armstrong, 
1993 WL 103830 (Md. Dept. Nat. Res. Feb. 24, 1993) (applying MD. ENVIR. CODE. ANN. 
§ 4-417(d) (1993) containing penalty factors); Crown Cent. Petroleum v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. 
Management, 1993 WL 53051 (Feb. 17, 1993) (applying ALA. CODE § 22-22A-5(18) (1990) 
containing penalty factors). 
However, penalties may also be arrived at in settlement without using criteria. See Mapco 
Petroleum Inc., 1993 WL 113579 (Tenn. Dept. Envtl. Conserv. Mar. 17, 1993). In this final order 
a gas station owner settled with the Tennessee Department of Environmental Conservation for 
$7500 damages, $7500 penalty and a potential $20,000 penalty if the owner failed to comply with 
the order's requirements. The tank owner failed to report a leak, and failed to provide inventory 
records that would have indicated shortages from his tanks. This order required him to clean 
up his site, continue testing for contamination, and stipulated that he would be ineligible for any 
state reimbursement from the Underground Storage Tank Fund. 
Massachusetts settled a suit against several oil companies for underground contamination 
near Provincetown, Massachusetts, for $3.14 million. This was claimed to be the largest settle-
ment recovered by a municipality for oil leakage that did not contaminate a municipal water 
supply. See Parties Reach $3.14 Million Settlement in Leaking Underground Storage Tank 
Case, OIL SPILL INTELLIGENCE REP., Dec. 3, 1992, at 9. 
In what appears to be the first case of its kind, the Orange County District Attorney has 
obtained an indictment against owners of several leaking USTs for felony illegal underground 
storage of hazardous waste. O.C. Couple Arrested in Hazardous Material Case, L.A. TIMES, 
May 22, 1992, § A at 3 (Orange County ed.). The indicted couple owned 150 southern California 
gasoline stations and were accused of falsifying tank tests. 
218 See Lloyd Properties, 1993 WL 42259 (Cal. St. Wat. Res. Bd. Jan. 21, 1993). In this order 
the state denied a tank owner state fund reimbursement for his cleanup expenses. The owner 
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As in the federal context, a state administrative law judge's appli-
cation of penalty criteria is subject to administrative appeal, but on 
appeal the enterprise must show that the judge erroneously applied 
the criteria. Although an enterprise cannot question the fact findings 
made by the judge,219 an order's corrective action requirements may 
be appealed.220 Many state administrative appeals involve regulatory 
decisions to deny reimbursement from state UST funds for corrective 
action.221 
Most states have established funds to clean up tank sites and com-
pensate victims. These funds take the place of the financial responsi-
bility requirement in federal law. Usually, the fund's budget is sup-
plied by a tax on fuel sales.222 In such a case, a tension exists between 
cleaning up sites in cases where no liable and financially capable party 
can be assigned the costs, and keeping the fuel tax level low.223 In 
addition, clean-up contractors wary of their own liability seek to pro-
vide expensive and extensive remediation rather than control costS.224 
spent $86,000 and expected to spend another $124,500. Although the owner had obtained proper 
permits for removing his tanks, because he had failed to obtain an initial tank owner's permit, 
the Board found he was ineligible to collect Fund reimbursement. The tank had been out of use 
since 1981. Id. 
219 See G.D. Armstrong, Md. Dept. Nat. Res. 1993 WL 103830 (Md. Dep't Nat. Res. Feb. 24, 
1993) (increasing penalty to correct error); Crown Central Petroleum v. Alabama Dept. of Envtl. 
Management, 1993 WL 53051 (Feb. 17, 1993) (reducing penalty to correct error). 
220 See Hrivnak Motor Co. v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Envtl. Res., 1993 WL 166333 (Pa. Envtl. 
Hrg. Bd. April 6, 1993) (altering order's corrective action requirements because of changed 
circumstances). Corrective action decisions may eventually be appealed in a court of law. See 
Sunshine Jr. Stores Inc. v. State of Florida, 556 So. 2d 1177, 1180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) 
(finding that Florida's department of Environmental Regulation erroneously applied corrective 
action statute to find owner liable for costs). 
221 See Norman Wong, DBA Auto Parts Distrib., 1993 WL 257948 (Cal. St. Wat. Res. Bd. June 
17, 1993) (appeal denied); State Bank of Whittington v. Ill. Envtl. Protect. Agency, 1993 WL 
210591 (Ill. Pol. Control Bd. June 3, 1993) (appeal granted in part, denied in part); Shell Oil Co. 
v. Ill. Envtl. Pro. Agency, 1993 WL 210603 (June 3, 1993) (appeal granted); Lloyd Properties, 
1993 WL 42259 (Cal. St. Wat. Res. Bd. Jan. 21, 1993) (appeal denied). Appeals must first be 
pursued through administrative appeals board before the enterprise can appeal an administra-
tive decision in a court of law. 
222 See, e.g., Michigan Underground Storage Tank Financial Assurance Act, MICH. STAT. ANN. 
§ 13.29(201) (Callaghan Supp. 1993-1994); California Underground Storage Tank Cleanup Fund, 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25299.50 (West 1992). 
223 See James R. Morrin, State Aims Amendments at Plugging Holes in Tank Program, CHI. 
LAW., Aug. 1993, at 2 (discussing legislative battle over amending Illinois's UST fund law). 
The IRS rejected an attempt to fund UST remediation by issuing tax-exempt municipal 
bonds. See Lynn S. Hume, IRS Won't Exempt Ohio Bonds to Fund Cleanup of Private Oil 
Tanks, PUB. FINANCEIWASH. WATCH, Nov. 30,1992, at 7. The IRS instead concluded that these 
bonds would be taxable private activity bonds. Id. 
224 See Mark Kass, PECFA State Says 'Our Sandbox, Our Rules,' CRAINS MILWAUKEE Bus. 
J., Dec. 19, 1992, § 1, at 1; Amber, Fund in Crisis as Cleanups Linger, CRAINS GRAND RAPIDS 
Bus. J., Nov. 23, 1992, § 1, at 1. 
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Some states seek to control fund expenditures by placing deduct-
ibles on enterprises that are large enough to be self-insured.225 Others 
place strict guidelines on what permits a tank owner must acquire 
before he can be reimbursed for site remediation.226 Even so, state 
funds run out ofmoney.227 In Michigan, for example, the state receives 
$4 million every month in fee revenue for its fund to cover payments 
of $15-17 million in requests.228 At the end of fiscal year 1992, Florida's 
fund held a balance of $24 million, but $139 million in claims had been 
filed against it.229 Even in states with solvent fund programs, the state 
is slow to reimburse claims.230 A recent study estimates that these 
state funds have collected $900 million a year in fees, but have paid 
out only $926 million, and only 44,000 sites have been cleaned up, an 
estimated ten percent of the tota1.231 EPA has yet to promulgate 
regulations to address what happens when state funds that replace 
225 See Brian, Legislature Changes Tank Law to Facilitate Access to Cleanup Funds, CRAINS 
WICHITA Bus. J., June 5,1992, § 1, at 20. The provision in Kansas's UST law that required a 
$100,000 deductible for UST owners capable of self-insurance was found unconstitutional. Id. 
226 Lloyd Properties, 1993 WL 42259 (Cal. St. Wat. Res. Bd. Jan. 21, 1993). 
227 See L.H. Otis, Mounting Pollution Risks Confront State La=kers, NAT'L UNDER-
WRITER, Nov. 30, 1992, at 2 (reporting shortfall in South Carolina's UST clean-up fund); Amber, 
supra note 224, at 1 (reporting that Michigan's fund, MUSTFA, ran out of money, contractor 
fraud suspected); Marilyn, supra note 95, at 1 (reporting that state's $3 million fund already 
used for that year). Michigan declared that it could no longer accept claims for UST remediation. 
See Carolyn Claerhout, Financial Difficulties Shake the Michigan Underground Storage Tank 
Fund, MICH. LAW. WKLY., Nov. 30, 1992, at 22. The Texas Water Commission's Petroleum 
Storage Tank Trust Fund has also run out of money. Laurel B. Calkins, Environmental Fund 
Tapped Out; Contractors Fold, Lay Off Workers, CRAINS HOUSTON Bus. J., May 17, 1993, § 1, 
at 1. In 1989, the fund was formed to gather $60 million in fees annually, but by January, 1993, 
all funds were spent, and $143 million in unpaid UST claims had accumulated. Id. Owners 
understand that reimbursement will not come quickly, and have slowed remediation efforts. Id. 
Contamination will spread during this delay, resulting in more costly remediation when funds 
are again available. Id. 
228 See Laura Blake, MUSTFA Claim Payments to be Cut, CRAINS GRAND RAPIDS Bus. J., 
July 5, 1993, at B6. The Illinois Legislature will probable increase its fuel fee to keep the Leaking 
Underground Storage Tank Reimbursement Fund solvent. See Morrin, supra note 223, at 22. 
As of September, 1993, 2,422 claims for reimbursement were pending in Michigan. State Tank 
Trust Fund Programs, REIMBURSEMENT NEWS, Sept.lOct. 1993 at 2~. 
229 Todd Sloan, Survey Finds States Still Going Green, CITY & STATE, July 15, 1993, at 9, 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File. 
A number of other state's funds show payment backlogs. See State Tank Trust Fund Pro-
grams, REIMBURSEMENT NEWS, Sept.lOct. 1993, at 2-3. Minnesota's fund reports $10 million 
in pending claims. Id. South Dakota's fund reports $10 million in pending claims under review. 
Id. 
230 See Stan Draenos, Money Trickles Slowly to Clean Leaks from Tanks, CRAINS SACRA-
MENTO Bus. J., Dec. 14, 1992, § 1, at 1. 
231 See $42 Billion More Neededfor LUST Cleanups, SUPERFUND WK., Dec. 25,1992 (quoting 
The Underground Storage Tank Market: Its Current Status and Future Challenges, by Envi-
ronmental Information Ltd. of Minneapolis, Minn.) 
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private liability requirements under the UST regulations become in-
solvent.232 
C. Massachusetts UST Regulation 
Massachusetts's state UST program provides a good example to 
examine more closely, because Massachusetts is densely populated 
and has historically shown concern for environmental safety. Massa-
chusetts's UST regulations are stricter than federal standards.233 
Owners and operators of USTs in Massachusetts are held responsible 
for UST leaks and remediation costs under the Massachusetts Oil and 
Hazardous Material Release Prevention and Response Act.234 Massa-
chusetts regulates USTs that store substances as specified in RCRA, 
and also USTs storing flammable liquids.235 Massachusetts requires 
permits for all USTs, and when upgrading, closing or removing 
USTs.236 The Massachusetts Contingency Plan requires that the com-
232 See Calkins, supra note 227, at 1 (quoting EPA spokesman David Bary, noting that 
although EPA has no regulations, UST owners may be found in non-compliance even though 
funds cannot cover remediation costs). 
233 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 14 (1992); MASS GEN. L. ch. 148, §§ 37~8I (1992). The Board of 
Fire Prevention promulgates these regulations, found at MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 527, §§ 9.00-.32 
(1993). 
As a "home rule" jurisdiction, Massachusetts state law does not preempt local regulation of 
USTs. Thus, the owner or operator of a UST faces a confusing patchwork of state and local 
regulation. See Gregor I. McGregor, Federal State and Local LUST Law, 1993, at 8-14 (on file 
with author). McGregor notes that every community on Cape Cod has their own UST bylaw or 
regulation. [d. at 9. 
McGregor is an attorney with the Boston environmental law firm McGregor and Shea. He 
also serves on the Underground Storage Tank Petroleum Product Cleanup Fund Administra-
tive Review Board. Comments attributed to McGregor in this article are made by him as an 
individual, and do not represent the views of the Board. 
234 MASS GEN. L. ch. 21E, §§ 1-18 (1992). Requirements and procedures for remedial response 
are at MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, §§ 40.500-.546 (1993). 
These regulations also provide for private actions against owners and operators of leaking 
USTs. See MASS GEN. L. ch. 21E, §§ 4, 11A(4) (1992); Mailman's Steam Carpet Cleaning Corp. 
v. Lizotte, 616 N.E.2d 85, 87 (Mass. 1993) (noting that plaintiff's award under ch. 21E limited to 
costs already incurred); Griffith v. New Eng. Tel. and Tel. Co., 610 N.E.2d 944, 945-46 (Mass. 
1993) (Applying ch. 21E to allow party spending money on remediation to recover costs from 
another liable party). The statute sets a three year statute of limitations for 21E reimbursement 
actions. MAss GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 11A(3) (1992). This statute of limitations was added in 1992. 
See Oliveira v. Pereira, 605 N.E.2d 287, 290 (Mass. 1992). 
236 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 40.327 (1988). 
236 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 527, §§ 9.10, 9.24, 9.26 (1988). Massachusetts regulations require 
that new and replacement tanks be double-walled if located in an EPA-designated sole-source 
aquifer area. MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 527, § 9.11(3) (1991). Massachusetts regulations do not allow 
leaking USTs to be relined. MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 527, § 9.21. Technical research on relining, 
however, suggests that, done properly, relining provides a relatively inexpensive method to 
extend a USTs useful life. See Stephen H. N acht, Analysis of Leak Prevention Technolo{!ies for 
Underground Storage Tanks, MATERIALS PERFORMANCE, July, 1989 at 28, 31~2. 
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monwealth be notified within two hours after discovery of a release 
or threat of release.237 Violations may be punished with civil penalties 
of up to $25,000 per violation per day.238 For failure to notify of a 
release, an owner or operator may face a $100,000 fine or 20 years in 
jail. 
To satisfy liability coverage requirements in federal UST regula-
tions, the Massachusetts legislature enacted the Massachusetts Un-
derground Storage Tank Trust Fund (Fund) in 1990.239 Fees charged 
for petroleum delivery and tank usage supply this fund with reve-
nue.240 Although the Fund is capped by statute at $30 million, fees 
would be reinstated if the Fund's balance falls below $10 million.241 
The Underground Storage Tank Petroleum Product Cleanup Fund 
Administrative Review Board (Board) can also adjust fees by regu-
lation if the statutory funding level proves inadequate.242 
The Massachusetts statute limits reimbursements to $1 million per 
tank for response action and $1 million for third party injury or 
damage reimbursement.243 To obtain reimbursement, UST owners 
must be in full compliance with all federal and state regulatory re-
quirements.244 To obtain reimbursement for third party judgments the 
applicant owner or operator must have obtained a final judgment and 
must have exhausted his rights of appeal.245 If the Board denies reim-
bursement, the applicant has thirty days to seek appeal, but has no 
right to appeal non-payment based on inadequacy of funds.246 
The Massachusetts legislature authorized this Fund in 1990, and as 
of September, 1993 the Fund contained $23.9 million in fees.247 Until 
the Board enacts implementing regulations, however, no funds will be 
available to tank owners, operators, or injured parties.248 Neverthe-
less, if an applicant fails to obtain money from the Fund, his remedia-
tion obligations do not cease. Thus, a Massachusetts tank owner and 
237 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 40.373 (1993). 
238 MASS GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 11 (1992). 
239 Underground Storage Tank Petroleum Product Cleanup Fund, ch. 524, Stat. 1990 (effective 
April 2, 1991) (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. L. ch. 213 (1992)). 
240 MASS GEN. L. ch. 2IJ, § 2(A) (1992) (charging $50 fee for each gasoline delivery, $200 fee 
for use of each UST); see also MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 502, § 4.00-.05 (1993) (implementing 
underground storage tank clean-up fees). 
241 MASS GEN. L. ch. 2IJ, § 2(D) (1992). 
242 MASS GEN. L. ch. 2IJ, § 2(B) (1992). 
243 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 213, § 5(a) (1992). 
244 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21J, § 9(a) (1992). 
245 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21J, § 9(d) (1992). 
246 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21J, § 11 (1992). 
247 See State Tank Trust Fund Programs, REIMBURSEMENT NEWS, Sept./Oct. 1993. 
248 See McGregor, supra note 232. McGregor suggests that these regulations will be in place 
by early 19!14. Telephone Interview with Gregor 1. McGregor (Oct. 22, 1993). 
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operator, whose financial liability obligation is purportedly assumed 
by the state's trust fund, may also need to obtain private insurance if 
the trust fund is unable to reimburse his expenses. 
V. THE REGULATORY IMPACT ON UST LITIGATION 
Underground tanks are now comprehensively regulated by state 
and federal agencies. Still, in some cases, plaintiffs seek compensation 
via common law actions.249 When states dictate remediation and pay 
compensation, however, the exercise of this state power may effec-
tively preempt private recovery. As a result, litigation now is com-
monly over who owes the state reimbursement-the UST owner, the 
insurance company, or a third party. 
Plaintiffs plead trespass, nuisance and strict liability for abnor-
mally dangerous activities to obtain compensation for UST damage. 
Modern interpretations of nuisance and trespass, however, often pre-
vent plaintiffs from using nuisance and trespass in most UST con-
texts. Also, many jurisdictions do not recognize underground gasoline 
storage as an abnormally dangerous activity. 
Early leaking oil cases held polluting defendants strictly liable for 
damages arising from oil leaking from their tanks.250 As the twentieth 
century progressed, however, the negligence rule replaced the strict 
liability rule in nuisance actions in some jurisdictions, and made it 
more difficult for injured neighbors to recover.251 Despite this trend, 
249 A plaintiff may pursue a statutory claim, or a common law claim. Statutory claims can be 
filed using RCRA, which allows citizens suits against past or present generators of hazardous 
waste, because the gasoline leaked from a UST can be considered the disposal of solid waste. 
See, e.g., Zands v. Nelson, 779 F. Supp. 1254, 1264 (S.D. Cal. 1991). This statutory suit would be 
barred, however, if the EPA has already brought an action or has commenced a cleanup. 42 
U.S.C. § 6972(b) (1988). In addition, state law may provide private rights of action under state 
UST regulations or other state environmental regulations. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23: 
11f(a)(2) (West 1992). Not all state statutes provide a private cause of action. See Lyden Co. v. 
Citgo Petroleum Corp., 1991 U.S. Dist LEXIS 19783, at *8-11 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 1991) (denying 
plaintiff's action under Ohio's UST regulations because regulations provide no private cause of 
action). Some states only provide for declaratory or equitable relief, but no monetary damages. 
See Zoufal v. Amoco Oil Co., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4920, at *11 (E.D. Mich Mar. 19, 1993) (noting 
that Michigan's Environmental Protection Act provides only declaratory or equitable relief). 
250 See Gavigan v. Atlantic Refining Co., 40 A. 834, 835 (Pa. 1898) (holding that this point so 
settled it would be a "waste of time" to review the cases); Hauck v. Tide Water Pipe-line Co., 
26 A. 644, 645 (Pa. 1893) (holding that if oil brought from a distance, leaking onto neighbors 
property and caused damage, pipeline owner strictly liable). Pennsylvania codified this standard 
into state law. See Jackson v. United States Pipeline Co., 191 A. 165, 165-66 (Pa. 1937) (noting 
that under P.L. 896 § 1 defendant strictly liable without negligence of oil from pipeline polluted 
neighbor's well). 
251 See Malone v. Ware Oil Co., 534 N.E.2d 1003, 1006--07 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (requiring that 
plaintiff show that oil company acted negligently or intentionally and unreasonably to maintain 
nuisance action); New York Tel. Co. v. Mobil Oil Co., 99 A.D.2d 185, 190-92 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) 
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some jurisdictions continued to recognize that owners of tanks or 
equipment that leaked oil and caused a nuisance were strictly liable 
for damages.252 
Modern common law courts also require intent for a plaintiff to 
prevail on a trespass claim.253 Although this intent requirement is 
applied consistently in leaky oil tank cases, in other areas plaintiffs 
may still recover in trespass absent a showing of intent.2M This con-
fusion may explain why this rule is still subject to dispute in cases on 
appeal. Trial judges as well as plaintiffs find the inconsistent require-
ments for trespass confusing. 
The only modern common law action that reliably allows a UST 
plaintiff to plead strict liability is an action to remedy damage from 
an abnormally dangerous activity. To prevail, therefore, the plaintiff 
must establish that storing gasoline in an underground tank quali-
fies as an abnormally dangerous activity. Courts make this legal con-
clusion on a case-by-case basis.256 Plaintiffs who prevail with this 
argument have shown that the tank's placement near a well,256 or its 
(holding that plaintiff can obtain damages for leaking UST if shows that defendant had notice 
of dangerous condition, did nothing to prevent it, or if dangerous condition created by defen-
dant); Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221, 222 (Tex. 1936) (holding that plaintiff must 
prove negligence to recover damages from water that escaped ponds adjacent to oil wells). The 
negligent party is often a prior owner, and action against him would often be barred by the 
statute of limitations for property damage, in New York three years. See New York Tel., 99 A.D. 
at 187-88. A recent New York case, however, calculated the statute of limitations from the last 
exposure to the leaking gasoline to find that a nuisance claim was not time-barred. See Cornell 
v. Exxon Corp., 558 N.Y.S.2d 647, 650 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). 
252 See Mel Foster Co. Properties v. American Oil Co., 427 N .W.2d 171 (Iowa 1988); City of 
Bridgeton v. British Petroleum Oil Co., 369 A.2d 49 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976) (noting that 
UST owner strictly liable to proper plaintiff for damage caused by UST leaks); Mowrer v. 
Ashland Oil Co., 518 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that lack of negligence no defense to charge 
that defendant maintained private nuisance). 
253 See Kulpa v. Stewart's Ice Cream, 144 A.D.2d. 205, 207 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Hudson v. 
Peavey Oil Co., 566 P.2d 175 (Or. 1977); Phillips v. Sun Oil, 121 S.E.2d 437 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973); 
Injuries and Damages from Hazardous Wastes-Analysis and Improvement of Legal Reme-
dies, A Report in Compliance with Section B01(e) of CERCLA by the "Superfund" Section 
B01(e) Study Group (Part II), No. 97-12, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 192 (1982) (memorandum from 
Frank P. Grad) (noting that strict liability rule for trespass "has been virtually abandoned"). 
For an air pollution case where the court found the requisite intent, see Bradley V. American 
Smelting Co., 709 P.2d 782 (Wash. 1985). 
264 See Margosian V. United States Airlines, 127 F. Supp. 464,466-67 (E.D.N.Y. 1955) (holding 
that plaintiff could recover for damage to property from airplane crash without showing will-
fulness and intent or negligent operation). 
256 See Injuries and Damages from Hazardous Wastes-Analysis and Improvement of Legal 
Remedies, A Report in Compliance with Section B01 (e) of CERCLA by the "Superfund" Section 
B01(e) Study Group (Part I), No. 97-12, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 192 (1982) (noting that strict 
liability cases for hazardous waste damage using inconsistent standards, are hard to compare). 
266 See Yommer V. McKenzie, 257 A.2d 138, 14(}..41 (Md. 1969). 
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size257 makes it uncommon or inappropriate. If a court follows the 
Restatement's criteria for abnormally dangerous activities/58 it will 
also apply a cost-benefit analysis to assess the value that the activity 
holds for the community against the danger it poses to the injured 
party.259 
Once a plaintiff in a leaking UST suit passes the negligence-liability 
hurdle, he must also plead and prove causation and injury. Causation 
may be difficult for a plaintiff to prove if several different gasoline 
stations could be the source of his contamination.260 Causation theories 
to compensate for a weak showing of a causal link between damage 
and the defendant's conduct, such as the joint liability theory in Sum-
mers v. Tice,261 are sometimes necessary in leaking tank cases.262 
A successful plaintiff will also have to plead and prove that the 
leaking tank injured him. Compared with toxics cases, proving injury 
from oil leakage is more straightforward.263 Leaking oil creates a 
257 See City of Northglenn v. Chevron Inc., 519 F. Supp. 515, 516 (D. Colo. 1981) (holding that 
16,000 gallon UST in residential area abnormally dangerous activity). 
258 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 contains these criteria: 
(a) the existence of a high degree of risk, (b) the likelihood that the resulting harm will 
be great, (c) the inability to eliminate that risk by the exercise of reasonable care, (d) 
the extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage, (e) the inappropri-
ateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on, (f) the extent to which its 
value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977). 
These criteria may exclude USTs from abnormally dangerous activities if the court considers 
that USTs are common, or appropriate to their place (gas stations), or valuable in comparison 
with the danger they pose. See Arlington Forest Ass'n v. Exxon Corp., 774 F. Supp. 387, 390-91 
(E.D. Va. 1991) (noting that USTs in common usage, appropriate in residential areas, and not 
dangerous if owner exercises due care, so not abnormally dangerous activity); Denis M. Toft & 
Stephen H. Bier, UnderqrlYUnd Storage Tank Liability After T & E, N.J. L. J. (Nov. 2,1992) at 
20. 
259 Hauling gasoline as cargo has been found an abnormally dangerous activity. See Siegler v. 
Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1187 (Wash. 1972). 
One article predicts a resurgence of the abnormally dangerous activities tort doctrine in 
hazardous waste litigation, because courts have been influenced by CERCLA. Jim C. Chen & 
Kyle E. McSlarrow, Application of Abnormally DangerlYUs Activities Doctrine to Environ-
mental Cleanups, 47 Bus. LAW. 1031 (1992). Other reforms include making exposure to toxic 
chemicals its own tort, with the defendant strictly liable for causing it. Carl B. Meyer, The 
Environmental Fate Of Toxic Wastes, The Certainty Of Harm, Toxic Torts, and Toxic Regula-
tion, 19 ENVTL. L. 321, 326-27 (1988). 
260 See ARBUCKLE ET AL., supra note 132, at 58 (discussing problems with proving causation 
in toxic tort context). 
261 199 P.2d 1,4 (1948) (holding two hunters jointly liable for plaintiff's injury even though 
plaintiff could not prove which hunter's bullet injured him). 
262 See Wilson v. McLeod Oil Co., 398 S.E.2d 586, 601 (N.C. 1990) (using a Summers-like 
argument to save plaintiff from summary judgment). 
263 Proof of injury difficulties in other kinds of toxics cases generally arise because the toxin 
is harmful in tiny doses not detectable by the injured party until years later when the injury 
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stench in drinking water and in contaminated soil, and can be detected 
in very small quantities in drinking water by taste.264 Homeowners 
are thus well aware of the contaminants, and may not consume the 
water.265 
The federal UST statutes and regulations do not preempt state 
statutory actions. Because the federal statute delegates to the states 
the authority to enforce state UST statutes, states may enforce their 
own regulations.266 An important question is whether these state reg-
ulations preempt state common law actions. The answer to this ques-
tion usually requires a court to determine whether the state legisla-
ture intended to preempt common law actions when the UST statute 
was passed. Generally, if the potential plaintiff obtains compensation 
under the statute, then his common law rights are probably pre-
empted. Moreover, UST regulations often assign liability before any 
appears. Common law courts in recent times have loosened injury proof standards to account 
for probable injuries with long gestations. In the Reserve Mining case, the court held that a 
potential health threat could be actionable if sufficiently serious. See Reserve Mining Corp. v. 
EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975). In subsequent cases, courts have held that the fact finder in 
a trial has broad discretion to find injury when a plaintiff has been exposed to uncertain but 
provable (and substantial) risk. See Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 89 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978) (upholding EPA's prohibition on the discharge of PCBs based on evidence that was 
"at least suggestive of carcinogenicity"); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1976) 
(concluding that no proof of actual harm was necessary to support regulation oflead in gasoline). 
But see National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating that fact finder's 
determinations must be made in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence). See 
generally Daniel A. Farber, Risk Regulation in Perspective: Reserve Mining Revisited, 21 
ENVTL. L. 1321, 1322 n.4. Many courts have held that the fact finder must also consider 
imminence and magnitude, not just harm's probability. See Sierra Club v. Sigler, 695 F.2d 957, 
970 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chern. Co., 579 F. Supp. 
823, 846 n.28 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Ayers v. Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987) (stating that the 
likelihood of harm is just one factor in determining proper intervention). The Reserve Mining 
holding has also been cited, however, to deny damages to plaintiffs based on unpredictable health 
consequences. See Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co., 528 F.2d 1107, 1125 (7th Cir. 1976); 
Spannaus v. Maple Hill Estates, 317 N.W.2d 53, 55 (Minn. 1982). Although oil plaintiffs usually 
can prove injury, to the extent that their damages may be extended by Reserve Mining, or that 
additional plaintiffs can maintain actionable suits, this less-rigorous proof of injury requirement 
may result in additional liability to owners of leaking oil tanks. 
264 See Wilson, 398 S.E.2d at 591 (describing that plaintiffs tasted contamination before tests 
revealed gasoline in water); Moore v. Mobil Oil, 480 A.2d 1012, 1016 (Pa. 1984) (noting that 
resident's water would taste obnoxious at level below health hazard). 
265 See, e.g., Alex Beasley, Toxic Chemicals on Tap, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Sept. 6 1992, 
§ A, at 1 (describing resident's detection of gasoline in well water). In at least one case, however, 
plaintiffs continued to consume water contaminated by gasoline. See Cornell v. Exxon Corp., 
558 N.Y.S.2d 647, 649 (Ct. App. 1990) (noting that defendant sought unsuccessfully to bar 
recovery under assumption of risk theory because plaintiff continued to use well water). 
266 See U.S. v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (lOth Cir. 1993) (CERCLA). 
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neighbor is harmed, and thus before any private cause of action would 
mature.267 
Because the state effectively declares liability and injunctive relief 
in the form of remediation requirements under state or federal UST 
laws, the legal battle has moved to third party compensation, either 
by lenders,268 past owners,269 or insurance. Often, commercial insur-
ance pollution clauses provide coverage only for "sudden and acciden-
tal" pollution, leaving the court to determine whether a leaking UST 
is sudden and accidenta1.27o Massachusetts courts have also wrestled 
267 States may be slow to declare an activity a public nuisance if it complies with statutes. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B, cmt. f (1977). 
Still, common law actions are brought to remedy harm caused by leaking USTs. See, e.g., 
Wilson v. McLeod Oil Co., 398 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. 1990) (holding that continuing trespass from 
leaking UST not barred by statute of limitations); Citizens & Southern Trust Co. v. Phillips 
Petroleum Co., 385 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that continuing torts only for 
personal injury, not tortious property damage, plaintiff barred by statute of limitations). 
268 In a very controversial decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit held that lenders may be liable for hazardous waste cleanup under CERCLA if they 
participate in the financial management of a facility to the extent they could influence the 
facility's treatment of hazardous waste. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 
1557 (8th Cir. 1990) (upholding summary judgment, but holding that district court's rule for 
secured creditors too lenient); 21 ENV. L. REP. 10618 (Oct. 1991) (discussing Fleet Factors). New 
EPA regulations narrowed this holding, to make lenders only liable if they actively managed 
the failed business. Although a similar limiting regulation has not yet been promulgated for the 
UST statutes, observers expect the EPA will follow through on public promises to publish a 
regulation to limit lender liability. See Lenders Hopeful Clinton, Congress will Resolve Lender 
Liability Under Pollution Cleanup Laws, MORTGAGE MARKETPLACE, Dec. 21, 1992, at 3. 
269 See Mailman's Steam Carpet Cleaning Corp. v. Lizotte, 616 N.E.2d 85 (Mass. 1993) (holding 
vendor liable for breach of warranty that USTs would not leak); Bunger v. Hartman, 797 F. 
Supp. 968 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (dismissing vendee suit against vendor for recovery of costs under 
CERCLA for UST leaks because of CERCLA petroleum exclusion); The Pantry, Inc. v. Stop-
and-Go Foods, Inc., 796 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (granting summary judgment for vendee 
because Kentucky statute provides that leaking USTs result in hazardous waste disposal); 
Zands v. Nelson, 779 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Cal. 1991) (denying defendant vendor's summary 
judgment motion, noting that plaintiff may recover from defendant under RCRA because 
leaking UST is disposal of solid waste). Many states recognize that ''hold harmless" or "as is" 
clauses will have legal force, preventing a subsequent purchaser from obtaining reimbursement 
from the seller. Zoufal v. Amoco Oil Co., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4920 (E.D. Mich. 1993); Niecko 
v. Emro Marketing, 973 F.2d 1296 (6th Cir. 1992); Brockton v. Chevron, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
9998 (Mass. 1990). However these hold harmless clauses do not bar third parties, such as injured 
neighbors, from seeking remedies for their injuries. See New York Tel. Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 
99 A.D.2d 185, 190-91 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). A subsequent owner will probably be unable to 
maintain an action for nuisance against the former owners in any case, because he is not a proper 
plaintiff. See Lyden v. Citgo, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19783 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (barring plaintiff 
from nuisance action because nuisance not applied between vendors and vendees). 
270 Some state courts find that leaking USTs are not "sudden and accidental." See Shell Oil v. 
Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 1993 Cal. App. LEXIS 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). Some states find 
that a leaking UST is "sudden and accidental." See Petr-all Petroleum Corp. v. Fireman's 
Insurance Co., 188 A.D.2d 139, 143 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (finding that leak may have occurred 
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with the liability issues sUITounding long-term leaking from USTs. In 
a recent case regarding interpretation of "sudden and accidental," the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court reversed a trial court's order of sum-
mary judgment in favor of an insurance carrier.271 This case suggests 
that leaking USTs are not always denied coverage under policies that 
cover only "sudden and accidental" discharges.272 Also, several state 
courts have held that government-mandated clean-up costs are also 
covered under commercial liability policies.273 The best defense insur-
ance companies usually can argue is that the owner intentionally or 
knowingly allowed the leaking tank to discharge oil and cause harm.274 
Nevertheless, under UST regulations, once the court assigns liability, 
either the particular policy purchased to meet the state's financial 
responsibility requirement or a state fund designed to satisfy the UST 
regulations will cover these expenses.275 As more states have formed 
funds to provide liability coverage for UST owners, the demand for 
private insurance has dropped.276 
Thus, the UST regulatory structure assigns rights and liabilities 
for most UST incidents. Although some plaintiffs continue to bring 
common law actions to remedy their injuries, most UST litigation 
revolves around reimbursement for state-ordered remediation costs. 
In most states, state-operated funds have taken the place of the 
private insurance market. When these funds run dry, no private al-
from an accidental incident rather than as a result of general operations, so insurance company 
has duty to defend defendant). Some states, however, have barred pollution exclusion clauses 
that only cover sudden and accidental emissions. See Gerrish v. Universal Underwriters, 754 F. 
Supp. 358, 368 (Vt. 1990) (interpreting insurance policy to cover UST leaks because state law 
barred pollution exclusion clauses); see generally Italiano, supra note 188, at 215, 235-39. 
271 Goodman v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 593 N.E.2d 233, 235 (Mass. 1992). 
272 Id. at 236. Under Massachusetts case law, a leak caused suddenly that nevertheless leaks 
for a time before discovery would be covered under such a policy. See id.; see also James E. 
McGuire & Diane E. Kenty, Policyholders Benefitfrom Recent Laws; Envircmmental Liability 
Insurance, MAss. LAW. WKLY., Aug. 3,1992, at 41. 
273 See, e.g., Alan Corp. v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 823 F. Supp. 33, 39--40, 44 (D. 
Mass. 1993) (holding that under terms of policy insurance company not liable for cleanup 
coverage unless costs ordered by government agency); Id. at 39--40. (denying coverage because 
insurance company notified after end of policy period); Gastel, supra note 98, Italiano, supra 
note 188, at 225. 
274 See Italiano, supra note 188, at 229. 
275 As of November, 1992,43 states had enacted legislation creating state-funded insurance 
for UST owners, generally financed by tank fees or fuel taxes. Gastel, supra note 98. Twenty-
nine of these had been approved by EPA. Id. 
276 See Deborah Shalowitz, Demand Drops for Cover for Underground Tanks; Buyers Turning 
to State Funds, Bus. INS., Nov. 23,1992, at 3. 
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ternative remains to pay for remediation and compensation, especially 
for small owners or operators.277 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Rather than produce a cleaner environment and compensate in-
jured pollution victims, the UST regulatory regime has added a com-
plicated legal layer to the problem of leaking USTs. At common law, 
a plaintiff suing for nuisance or trespass could, at least in some juris-
dictions, hold the tank owner strictly liable for any damage. Munici-
palities could hold the owner liable for maintaining a public nuisance. 
Injunctive relief could require the owner to clean the site appropri-
ately, and compensate injured neighbors via damages. 
In some jurisdictions, these actions were harder for plaintiffs to 
maintain. Some courts required that plaintiffs show a defendant's 
negligence or intent to recover.Z78 Additionally, some leaking tanks had 
been abandoned, and thus no owner was available to sue. It cannot be 
denied that some jurisdictions werenot providing effective remedies 
for damage arising from leaking USTs. Given the heightened public 
awareness of environmental harm and improved detection technology, 
more common law courts-if left alone-might have returned to the 
earlier and harsher trespass and nuisance standards. 
The present UST regulatory regime, however, leads to new prob-
lems. Regulators levy heavy fines for paperwork violations that pose 
no risk to the environment, thus adding to the costs faced by UST 
owners but not providing a direct environmental benefit.Z79 The cor-
rective action standards require enormously expensive remediation 
techniques.280 The financial responsibility requirements have forced 
owner's long-term technical improvements into the present.281 The 
federal regulations allow states to develop funds as an alternative to 
these financial responsibility requirements. As states have developed 
these funds to cover clean-up costs, however, the private insurance 
2il7 State financial responsibility programs may also, perversely, delay cleanup. See Italiano, 
supra note 188, at 216-17. 
2il8 See supra notes 11 ~9 and accompanying text. 
2il9 See supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text. 
280 As these costs drain state remediation funds, state regulators may be more anxious to 
prioritize sites. See Stevenson Swanson, Legislators Not Turning Green Yet, July 26, 1993, CHI. 
TRIB., July 26,1993, at 1 (quoting Illinois EPA Director Mary Gade saying that state EPA will 
rank tanks according to imminent threat, because treating all sites the same was "impossible"). 
281 See supra notes 179--84 and accompanying text. 
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, 
market to cover USTs has disappeared.282 These state funds are run-
ning out of money. 
Rather than implement a report-laden cradle-to-grave regulatory 
system, other regulatory measures might yield better results. Provid-
ing a strict liability standard in state statutes for private law plain-
tiffs, including municipalities, to hold leaking tank owners liable would 
channel legal efforts toward punishing those offenders who are caus-
ing serious harm.283 Allowing the private insurance market to operate 
without the artificial floor and ceiling provided by the financial respon-
sibility requirements and state financial responsibility funds would 
allow owners and their customers to bear the real cost of leaking 
tanks. A more modest insurance reform would be to incorporate a 
needs test into state fund reimbursements, to allow these funds to 
distinguish between large owners and operators capable of self-insur-
ance and small owners more needful of state assistance.284 Crafting 
regulations that provide strict clean-up standards for those tank sites 
that threaten drinking water, and more moderate containment stand-
ards for less vulnerable areas, would also better clean the environ-
ment with the scarce resources available.285 Programs to encourage 
owners to convert from USTs to above-ground tanks should also be 
considered.286 These regulations should be adopted and enforced at 
the most local level feasible, thereby allowing different jurisdictions 
the opportunity to try different strategies, depending on local condi-
tions.287 
282 See supra notes 222--24 and accompanying text. 
283 A similar reform was suggested in 1982 to enable injured plaintiffs to recover for injuries 
caused by hazardous waste. See Injuries and Damagesfrom Hazardous Wastes-Analysis and 
Improvement of Legal Remedies, A Report in Compliance with Section 301(e) of CERCLA by 
the "Superfund" Section 301(e) Study Group (Part I), No. 97-12, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 245 (1982). 
284 See Italiano, supra note 188, at 216 ("It is questionable public policy for states and EPA to 
allow payment of public funds to large corporations that have little or no financial need."). But 
see Legislature Changes Tank Law to Facilitate Access to Cleanup Funds, CRAINS WICHITA 
Bus. J., June 5, 1992, § 1, at 20 (noting that Kansas's UST law that required a $100,000 
deductible for UST owners capable of self-insurance found unconstitutional). 
285 Massachusetts regulations reflect this idea somewhat, by requiring more onerous technical 
specification for tanks in more sensitive areas. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 527, § 9.05(D)(3) 
(1993). 
286 See W. David McCaskill, ASTs-A Hot Alternative to USTs, MATERIALS PERFORMANCE, 
Jan. 1993, at 17; Italiano, supm note 188, at 258. 
287 See BRUCE YANDLE, THE POLITICAL LIMITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 59 (1989). 
'. 
